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INTRODUCTION
A powerful legal, social, and religious construct grounded in the
disapproval of sexual intercourse outside of marriage, illegitimacy2 of birth
1. See Charlotte Rotman, Gestation pour autrui: les enfants fantômes de la
République, LA LIBÉRATION, May 20, 2009, http://www.liberation.fr/societe/
0101568271-gestation-pour-autrui-les-enfants-fantomes-de-la-republique.
*
Professor of Law, City University of New York. J.D., Columbia, 1993; M.A.,
Columbia, 1989; B.A., Miami University, 1987. I wish to thank Jessica Levy for her
excellent research assistance and CUNY School of Law for its generous research
support.
2. I am sensitive to the fact that this archaic and harsh term has been the source of
much injustice and psychic harm. I use it in this Article to emphasize how damaging it
is to attach any legal disability to families or children created without marriage. Thus, I
do not use the term in the “morally neutral” way a sociologist might, see, e.g.,
LEWELLYN HENDRIX, ILLEGITIMACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES: CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES ON NONMARITAL BIRTH 2 (1996), but recognize that any term used to
describe children born out of wedlock as a class will inevitably have “moral
overtones,” especially when used in the context of establishing or justifying differential
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has been a source of abiding concern and fascination throughout history.
Essentially a badge separating insiders from outsiders, illegitimacy as a
category has been promoted by the church, nation states, and society at
large to encourage marriage as the only appropriate locus for family
formation.3 Parents of nonmarital children have been branded licentious
reprobates, their children vilified as interlopers, subhuman, unworthy of
civil status, and even loathed by their own parents.4 The harshest means of
exclusion have been the imposition of disabilities in the establishment of
legal parentage,5 naming,6 and support and inheritance rights,7 and the
institutionalization of infant abandonment,8 and even banishment.9 These
disabilities have had a disproportionate impact on women and the poor10
and are understood today to have been the tools of a patriarchal order

treatment of children. Id. In addition, I agree that it is best to employ historically
accurate terminology in an effort to confront the very real stigma that has always
attached, in some cases despite our best intentions, to the use of terms like “bastard,”
“illegitimate child,” “born out of wedlock,” and “nonmarital.” See E. WAYNE CARP,
FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION xiii
(1998).
3. See CARP, supra note 2, at 4; Kathleen Kiernan, European Perspectives on
Nonmarital Childbearing, in OUT OF WEDLOCK: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
NONMARITAL FERTILITY 77, 105-06 (Lawrence L. Wu & Barbara Wolfe eds., 2001);
THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION 237 (Richard A. Shweder ed., 2009)
(commenting on the work of sociologist Kingsley Davis); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE SINS
OF THE FATHERS: THE LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED 4 (2009).
4. See Richard F. Storrow, Equal Protection for Human Clones, 40 FAM. L.Q.
529, 542 (2006) [hereinafter Storrow, Equal Protection].
5. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972) (“Under Illinois law, the
children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the mother.”).
Now that highly accurate and inexpensive means of genetic testing are easily available,
the establishment of paternity has become an area fraught with difficult questions. See
Ira Ellman, Thinking about Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 36
FAM. L.Q. 49, 55 (2002); Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for
Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 252-53 (2006). As a
constitutional matter, where a marital presumption of paternity applies, the law does
not require that parentage between a child and his biological father be recognized. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989).
6. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 711 (emphasizing the lack of rights of
illegitmate children including the right to their father’s last name).
7. See id.; Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias
in Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66
MO. L. REV. 527, 600-01 (2001) [hereinafter Storrow, Family Privacy] (discussing
how several states have passed legislation denying fathers inheritance rights unless they
acknowledged their children).
8. See generally JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE
ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE
RENAISSANCE 2 (1988); DAVID KERTZER, SACRIFICED FOR HONOR: ITALIAN INFANT
ABANDONMENT AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL 4 (1993).
9. JOEL FRANCIS HARRINGTON, THE UNWANTED CHILD: THE FATE OF
FOUNDLINGS, ORPHANS, AND JUVENILE CRIMINALS 44 (2009); JOHN WITTE, GOD’S
JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 420 (2006).
10. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 591.
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variously committed to extolling marital nuclear families,11 genetic
essentialism,12 and ethnic and religious purity.13
Whatever deterrent effect the legal disabilities of illegitimacy may once
have had appears to have slackened considerably, as the social stigma
attached to premarital sexuality, cohabitation and the birth of children outof-wedlock has waned.14 Demographic data on fertility in the United States
indicates a steady increase of births to unmarried women since the 1960s.
As of 2005, out-of-wedlock births comprised 37% of all births.15 Of these,
40% are born to cohabiting parents.16 Today, the majority of children born
to American women under the age of 30 are nonmarital.17 In parts of
Europe the percentage of couples who are not officially married is as high
as 25% (Norway) and is expected to increase “along with the tendency for
nonmarital unions to become more prone to the birth of children . . . .”18
Although some see these as disturbing trends, today it may simply “be
reductionist to view child and family welfare merely as a function of
marriage or illegitimacy.”19
As a result of the work of committed advocates, children born to single
women and to unmarried heterosexual couples labor under far fewer
constraints than they did when nonmarital fertility was considered a more
11. See Storrow, Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 541-42; Storrow, Family
Privacy, supra note 7, at 530, 620; Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the
Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and
Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 348 (2006) [hereinafter Storrow,
Rescuing Children] (addressing how the American marriage movement views
heterosexual marriage as central to social integrity and aims to deter any forces that
threaten its primacy).
12. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 24 (describing the church’s reverence for the
consanguineous nuclear family).
13. See R. Charli Carpenter, Surfacing Children: Limitations of Genocidal Rape
Discourse, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 428, 492-30 (2000) (describing how forced impregnation
and the birth of children of mixed ethnicity was aimed at “corroding the victimized
culture” in the former Yugoslavia).
14. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 341; STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE
NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 186 (1992).
15. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 245. Stephanie Coontz found that the rate of
out-of-wedlock births was similar in the Puritan community of Concord, Massachusetts
before the Revolutionary War. See COONTZ, supra note 14, at 184.
16. THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 591.
17. Jason DeParle & Sabrina Tavernise, For Women under 30, Most Births Occur
Outside Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at A1.
18. THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 590.
19. Wolfgang Hirczy de Mino, From Bastardy to Equality: The Rights of
Nonmarital Children and their Fathers in Comparative Perspective, 31 J. COMP. FAM.
STUD. 231, 233 (2000); see also Richard F. Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption Through
the Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 479, 507-10 (2006)
[hereinafter Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption] (criticizing a proposal to bestow a
preferred status on married couples in the adoption process); Storrow, Rescuing
Children, supra note 11, at 320-23, 342-44, 367-69 (criticizing presumptions of
parental fitness and child welfare that are based on marital status).
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serious threat to social stability than it is today. Although the reforms of
the latter half of the twentieth century were among the most sweeping in
dismantling legal distinctions based on legitimacy of birth,20 the injustice of
disadvantaging children born out of wedlock was recognized long before
rates of out-of-wedlock births increased.21 Significant improvement in the
legal position of children born out of wedlock actually occurred decades
earlier in Europe, when Norway, for example, began to permit children
born out of wedlock to inherit from their biological fathers in 191622 and
Sweden banned the use of “illegitimate” in official documents in 1917.23
In the same year, illegitimacy as a status was abolished in Russia following
the Bolshevik Revolution.24 More recently, even families headed by gay
and lesbian couples who have adopted children or used assisted
reproductive technologies have achieved a level of recognition previously
unimagined.25
Strides toward equal legal and social treatment have been of enormous
benefit to children born out of wedlock, but discrimination and harassment
against “illegitimate families” linger and thrive, whether in rules about who
can marry26 and why,27 attitudes about who should be excluded from
reproducing or adopting,28 perspectives on citizenship,29 and the fact that
20. See Storrow, Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 541-42 (describing reforms that
erased some of the stigma surrounding illegitimacy and how illegitimacy as a status fell
out of favor). See generally Storrow, Family Privacy, supra note 7, at 600-10.
21. See, e.g., James Kidd, The Law of Bastardy, 8 JURID. REV. 180, 180 (1896)
(emphasizing the injustice and harshness of the law towards children born out of
wedlock).
22. See Kiernan, supra note at 3, at 106. A different source gives this date as 1915.
See HENDRIX, supra note 2, at 149.
23. Kiernan, supra note 3, at 106.
24. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 2.
25. See id. at 592 (noting States where parentage determinations apply equally to
same-sex couples or where stepparent adoption is available to same-sex couples to
establish legal parentage in a de facto parent); Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption, supra
note 19, at 512 n.218 (cataloging European countries that grant recognition to gay- and
lesbian-headed families with children).
26. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 132-38, 159-61 (2010) (discussing the
role of debates over same-sex marriage in the culture wars).
27. Marriage is generally permitted for any reason or for no reason; however, a
marriage entered into for the purpose of obtaining permanent resident immigration
status is considered fraudulent. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537.
28. See Richard F. Storrow, Medical Conscience and the Policing of Parenthood,
16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 369, 372-75 (2010) [hereinafter Storrow, Medical
Conscience] (discussing case of lesbian refused intra-uterine insemination by religious
doctors); Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption, supra note 19, at 499-511 (critiquing the
argument that married couples should receive preferential treatment in adoption);
Storrow, Rescuing Children, supra note 11, at 367-69 (arguing that marriage is too
faulty a proxy for parental fitness to adequately promote the best interests of children);
Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper
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not all children receive the same entitlements. As Barbara Stark has put it,
“[w]hile laws renouncing illegitimacy are widespread, in practice the
stigma remains strong in some parts of the world.”30 Even the United
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child, boasting 140 signatories,31
does not explicitly outlaw discrimination against nonmarital children;32
moreover, some countries that adopted the convention did so “without
prejudice to national law provisions that discriminated between marital and
nonmarital children.”33
Lingering prejudicial attitudes toward and disparate treatment of children
born out of wedlock can be traced to intractable notions of the importance
of marriage for children and society.34 Despite the progress made toward
dismantling disparate treatment based on “illegitimacy” of birth, a new
strain of disparate treatment of “illegitimate” children is emerging in
response to the widespread use of reproductive technology to have
children, particularly when it is used by families not headed by
heterosexual couples. Since reproductive technology removes sex from the
reproductive process, this new form of illegitimacy has nothing to do with
the fear that illicit sexual behavior will result in children. It arises from the
fear that children will be created without sex and in some cases will be born
to gay and lesbian couples or single individuals, all with the participation
and contribution of third parties. This new illegitimacy is not reserved for
Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283-84 (2007)
(discussing patient-selection screening practices in infertility clinics).
29. See ANN LAQUER ESTIN AND BARBARA STARK, GLOBAL ISSUES IN FAMILY LAW
92 (2007) (“Rules about legitimacy and paternity are grounded in assumptions about
identity and citizenship that may be so deeply ingrained that they are unquestioned,
accepted as ‘natural,’ in a particular culture.”); Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate
Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV.
345, 361-63 (2011) (discussing how, in ascribing citizenship, immigration law
discriminates against nonmarital children on the basis of birth status).
30. Barbara Stark, Baby Girls from China in New York: A Thrice-Told Tale, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 1231, 1295.
31. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/
Chapter%20IV/IV-11.en.pdf.
32. See id. at art. 2, 7.
33. D. MARIANNE BLAIR ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 26 (2d
ed. 2009).
34. See Storrow, Rescuing Children, supra note 11, at 351-56 (discussing
arguments about the value of marriage in marriage movement rhetoric). The value of
marriage in marriage movement argumentation is often associated with financial or
sexual benefits. See, e.g., Robert Rector, How Not to Be Poor, 57 NAT’L REV. 26
(2005), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2005/10/how-notto-be-poor (higher income and superior standard of living). The argument that
marriage should carry a status superior to other relationships is not limited to those who
oppose same-sex marriage. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The
ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL. F. 353, 359-62.
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nontraditional families, however.35 The participation of third parties in the
reproductive process calls into question the legitimacy of even the family
of a married husband and wife who choose to reproduce in this fashion.
The essence of the new illegitimacy, then, is what Elizabeth Bartholet has
termed “biologism,” the view that those families in which the rearing
couple have also made the gestational and genetic contribution to their
children are more legitimate.36 Biologism, of course, means that married
couples, unmarried couples, and single individuals who employ
reproductive technology are all at risk of being seen as illegitimate and will
suffer whatever disabilities the new illegitimacy might entail.
Both the old and new illegitimacy are the tools of a politics of exclusion.
Although the new illegitimacy is preoccupied with matters of citizenship37
to a degree the old illegitimacy was not, both approaches to labeling a child
or a family illegitimate reflect efforts to exclude them from the prerogatives
legitimate families are deemed to merit. This is particularly salient in the
context of international commercial surrogacy in the same jurisdictions that
have rejected the very notion of illegitimate children as archaic and
35. Professor Elvia Arriola objects to the term “nontraditional” as applied in this
context because it creates the impression that the family in question is itself
illegitimate. See Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691, 694 (1997). At the risk of reinforcing it, I use the term in
this Article to underscore this unfortunate usage. “Alternative” is sometimes used
instead of “nontraditional.” See, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH
APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 361 (3d ed. 2006).
36. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE
NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 48, 93, 170 (1999) (noting that the law structures
adoption in imitation of biology); CARP, supra note 2, at xiii, 4 (describing societal
suspicion about parenting in the absence of genetic and gestational connections).
37. Citizenship also figures prominently in contemporary examples of other
“outlawed children.” See, e.g., Nobue Suzuki, Outlawed Children: Japanese Filipino
Children, Legal Defiance and Ambivalent Citizenships, 83 PAC. AFF. 31, 41 (2010)
(reporting on Japan’s practice, only recently dismantled, of disadvantaging children of
Korean heritage).
Like Europe, the United States is currently in the throes of battles over immigration.
Compare MARK KRIKORIAN, THE NEW CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION 1-2 (2008)
(emphasizing that current immigration is not compatible with modern society), with
JASON L. RILEY, LET THEM IN: THE CASE FOR OPEN BORDERS 2 (2008) (discussing that
the targets of immigration have changed but the same concerns of the past persist).
Birthright citizenship is a particularly contentious issue in the debate. Some want to
deny birthright citizenship thto children born to illegal immigrants. J. Richard Cohen,
Campaigning to Rewrite 14 Amendment Based on Fearmongering Politics, Not Facts,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2011, 2:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jrichard-cohen/campaign-to-rewrite-14th-_b_841480.html.
They equate birthright
citizenship in this context to “maternity tourism.” See Jennifer Medina, Arriving as
Pregnant Tourists, Leaving with American Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/us/29babies.html. In response to this concern,
several European countries have ended birthright citizenship. See Daniel González &
Dan Nowicki, Birthright Citizenship Change Would Have Wide Effects, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Mar. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/
news/articles/2011/03/20/20110320birthright-citizenship-illegal-immigration.html.
Thirty countries still have birthright citizenship; none are in Europe. Id.
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discriminatory. Citizens of several European and Asian countries,
including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and
Japan have been refused travel documents for their newborn children by
consular officials upon suspicion that they have engaged in international
commercial surrogacy in the United States, India, or the Ukraine. Upon
arriving home (the children sometimes using passports issued by the
countries in which they were born and at other times traveling on special
humanitarian visas), parents have met with official refusal to recognize
their parent-child relationships or to bestow citizenship upon the children.38
In France alone, these refusals befall an estimated 400 French couples each
year,39 leading lawyer Valérie Depadt-Sebag to designate the children “a
new category of pariahs”40 that reintroduces a distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate long ago expunged from the law.41 The
response of several European and Asian nations to surrogate births reflects
the tenacity of illegitimacy as a social and legal construct and proves that
this most irresistible form of “othering”42 cannot simply be wiped out by
commitment to equality and expungement of “illegitimacy” from the
statutes of enlightened jurisdictions.43 The idea lingers on in “marriage
movement” rhetoric deploying the message that children are better off with
married parents and advocating preferential treatment for heterosexual
married couples in matters of adoption and assisted reproduction.44
This Article examines the new illegitimacy in Europe, a continent that,
like the United States, has rejected discriminatory treatment of children
born out of wedlock, but that embraces a much more robust commitment to
marriage equality than we find in the United States.45 The new illegitimacy
38. See generally Rotman, supra note 1.
39. Id. (estimating that 400 couples each year go abroad to use surrogacy).
40. Charlotte Rotman, “Filles fantôme” en mal de noms [Girl Ghosts in Need of

Name], La Libération, Feb. 18, 2010 (Fr.), http://www.liberation.fr/
societe/0101620002-filles-fantomes-en-mal-de-nom.
41. Id. (quoting lawyer Nathalie Boudjerada).
42. See JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 12-13
(1982) (“[B]y ostracizing illegitimate individuals and unmarried mothers, one
demonstrates one’s own legitimacy and one’s loyalty to the sexual and property laws of
the community.”).
43. In the United States, several jurisdictions have revised their statutes to remove
the term “illegitimate” to describe children born out of wedlock. See, e.g., Illegitimate
Children, S.B. 65, 2004 Reg. Leg., (La. 2004). In Europe, as early as 1917, the
Swedish government banned the use of the term “illegitimate” in official documents.
See Kiernan, supra note 3, at 106.
44. See Storrow, Rescuing Children, supra note 11, at 353-55 (discussing marriage
movement arguments that children raised by married parents are better off than those
not raised by married parents); see also Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption, supra note
19, at 499-511 (discussing the argument that married heterosexual couples should
receive preferential treatment in adoption).
45. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but Not Parents /
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in Europe results from the entrenchment of the principle that the legal
mother of a child is always the gestational mother and the concomitant
widespread disapproval and legal prohibition of surrogacy. When citizens
of countries that ban surrogacy choose to pursue surrogacy elsewhere, they
and their children meet with hostility, opprobrium, and exclusion upon
their return. The resort to surrogacy abroad subjects these families to legal
disabilities that recall the disadvantageous treatment of children born out of
wedlock received under what are now considered discriminatory legal
regimes that violate human rights norms. This Article also explores the
resurgence of illegitimacy in Europe and reflects on the practice
implications for attorneys advising couples and individuals who wish to use
surrogacy in other countries.
This Article unfolds in several parts. Part I explores illegitimacy in legal
history and includes a discussion of how assisted conception has very often
been associated with adultery and illegitimacy. With this history as a
backdrop, Part II will explore the new illegitimacy in Europe and will trace
in particular the cases that have forced France to reopen the national
dialogue that in the 1990s resulted in the outright rejection of surrogacy.
Part III will examine various responses to the problem of international
commercial surrogacy. Finally, this Article will consider the practice
implications for attorneys assisting couples and individuals who wish to
pursue surrogacy either in the United States or abroad.
I. ILLEGITIMACY IN LEGAL HISTORY
Historically, the legal treatment of nonmarital children has been unkind.
At its most egregious, canon and common law treated nonmarital children
as the children of no one, meaning they had no connection to society or to
any enforceable means of support and suffered a host of heavy legal
disabilities.46 Roman law was not originally quite so harsh, requiring
mothers who kept their illegitimate children to support them,47 but the later
Christian emperors denied certain classes of illegitimate children all
support.48 Roman law also developed grades of illegitimacy, separating
nonmarital children into classes according to the gravity of the sexual
offense that led to their birth. Thus, children born of fornication were
natural;49 those resulting from adultery were spurious.50
Natural
Recognizing Parents but Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and
the United States, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711, 719-28 (2000).
46. See TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 60 (referring to canon law and the common
law); WITTE, supra note 3, at 122, 124.
47. WITTE, supra note 3, at 52.
48. Id. at 55.
49. Id. at 60; see TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 54.
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illegitimates “had certain legal claims on the father for support.”51 Since
natural illegitimates were considered to arise from “natural” lapses of
sexual judgment, it was determined that they should not suffer,52 and ways
were devised for them to be legitimated.53 One of these was for the
biological father to marry the biological mother.54 Formerly, if they did not
marry during the pregnancy, the opportunity for legitimation of the child by
marriage of his parents was lost.55 These methods of legitimation were
described as “gifts” from both nature and law,56 nature providing the
category of natural illegitimacy and the law providing the methods of
legitimation.
The treatment of spurious illegitimates was harsher. The methods of
legitimation available to the parents of natural illegitimates were
unavailable to them. Nonetheless, a spurious legitimate could be
legitimated if the husband of the adulterous wife accepted the child as his
own.57 There was a debate, however, about whether adoption could
legitimate the spuriously illegitimate. Justinian tried to abolish adoption,
believing that if it were available as an avenue to the legitimation of
spurious illegitimates it would encourage adultery and incest.58 The use of
adoption to legitimate the spurious was affirmed, however, by Justinian’s
successor Leo III. Leo III wanted adoption to be available to everyone
because of the benefits it bestowed upon parents and children alike; an
adoptee’s rights were the same as other children or family members.59 This
question of whether adoption could legitimate an illegitimate child
continued to perplex jurists well into the twentieth century. In 1959, a
county court judge in England refused to allow the adoption of a child by
his natural mother because “it could not be anything but contrary to the
public interest to make it easier to remove the stigma of
illegitimacy . . . .”60 The decision appears to have been based in part on the
50.
51.
52.
53.

WITTE, supra note 3, at 55
TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 54.
WITTE, supra note 3, at 60.
See id. at 61. The distinction between natural and spurious illegitimates
lingered in the laws of certain countries well into the Twentieth Century. See, e.g.,
Johnston v. Ireland, 9697/82 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 28 (1986) (describing a statute that limited
legitimation to children whose parents “could have been lawfully married to one
another at the time of the child’s birth or at some time during the period of ten months
preceding such birth”).
54. WITTE, supra note 3, at 61; TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 54.
55. WITTE, supra note 3, at 55.
56. Id. at 62.
57. Id. at 53.
58. Id. at 62.
59. Id. at 64.
60. See TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 73 (describing the case of In re D.).
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notion that “only a man can legitimate a child” and the concern, similar to
that voiced by Justinian, that adoption would become an avenue toward
“universal legitimacy.”61
The idea that the harsh treatment of illegitimate children was needed to
deploy a strong message against illicit sexual conduct created a tension for
policymakers from very early times. Imposing vicarious liability on an
employer is one thing, but relegating a child to an inferior status based on
the sinfulness of the sexual act that led to his conception, all in an attempt
to deter illicit sexual behavior, strikes us today as extraordinarily unjust and
exceedingly naïve. It would not be until the twentieth century, that
disapproval of differential treatment of children born out of wedlock would
be enshrined in international human rights documents and judicial
decisions.
Disagreement about what direction the law of illegitimacy should take
has led to a waxing and waning of the opprobrium directed at illegitimate
children across the centuries. The early Jewish teaching sharply limited
those who could be labeled illegitimate and preferred to warn individuals
that a child born out of wedlock, while he might not be illegitimate, could
well suffer undesirable social consequences.62 Early Christian teachings on
sex, marriage, and family relations laid the groundwork for the more
expansive doctrine of illegitimacy that would emerge later. The early
Christian view was that marriage was the only appropriate locus for sex
and that even non-procreative sex within marriage should be avoided.63
But this instruction did not lead inexorably to the condemnation of
illegitimate children. To the contrary, certain early church figures
denounced such treatment. The blame for illicit sex, according to this
view, properly lay with the parents, not the children.64 Thus, like the early
Jewish teachings, the early Christian teachings, taking account of the ill
treatment that illegitimates would face due to the prevailing cultural norms,
preferred to warn individuals away from extramarital sex.65
We owe the more highly developed law of illegitimacy to the melding of
the early Christian church’s concern with stamping out illicit sexual
conduct with the Roman law’s complex doctrine of illegitimacy and its
ramifications.66 The medieval mind found it quite easy to understand how
children could be made to pay for the sins of their parents.67 The resulting
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 74.
See WITTE, supra note 3, at 25.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 101.
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children were, after all, the witnesses or evidence of that evil.68 The extent
to which the common law jurists bristled against what they saw as an
internally inconsistent Roman system69 laid the groundwork for what today
appears to have been “a Christian theology of sin run amok.”70 The JudeoChristian legal tradition desired above all that proscriptions on illicit sexual
relations and their evidence—illegitimacy of birth—appear simply to be
natural-law borrowings from the Bible. There is some disagreement about
this, but the point is that eventually the doctrine of illegitimacy was until
very recently one of the most important tools used for expressing the
importance of and channeling people into marital relationships.71
A. The European Court of Human Rights
It was the judiciary that played the most significant role in addressing the
discrimination against nonmarital children that lingered in the latter half of
the twentieth century. Most of this discrimination was deployed by laws
governing inheritance. Inheritance by nonmarital children was forbidden
because it would legitimate illicit sexual relations. As a result, allowing
nonmarital children to inherit was deemed contrary to a decedent’s
presumed intentions.
The European Court of Human Rights is considered Europe’s de facto
constitutional court and the European Convention on Human Rights its de
facto Bill of Rights. The Court was created by a treaty, enacted at Rome in
1950 and entered into force in 1953, to which all forty-seven members of
the Council of Europe are bound.72 Membership in the Council of Europe,
established to guarantee human rights,73 is obligatory for all states that wish
to join the European Union.74
The Court is vested with the duty to limit member states’ discretion to
68. Id. at 123.
69. One example would be the Roman law prohibition on parental support for

spurious illegitimates, id. at 125, but permitting spurious illegitimates to hold office
because “[they have] committed no crime.” Id. at 53.
70. See id. at 8 (commenting on the differences between today’s illegitimate
children and those of the past).
71. See id. at xii (examining the history of illegitimacy and its relationship to the
doctrine of marriage).
72. See A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEMS 3 & n.1 (Helen Keller & Alex Stone Sweet eds., 2008) (claiming the
European Convention on Human Rights is the most effective of its type in the world)
[hereinafter A EUROPE OF RIGHTS].
73. See MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (2007) (providing that the guarantee of human rights defines
European values and identity).
74. See A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 19 & n.44 (providing that
membership in the European Court of Human Rights has been mandatory for all
European Union states since the early 1990s).
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interfere with the human rights enumerated in the Convention. Although
the effect of its jurisprudence is frequently contested, given that it “does not
possess the authority to invalidate national legal norms judged to be
incompatible with the Convention,”75 it nonetheless commands broad
allegiance thanks to “the goodwill and good faith of most states.”76 The
Court’s growing political legitimacy has earned it a sterling international
reputation as “the most effective human rights regime in the world.”77
Despite this reputation, the Court’s function can be tricky to carry out given
the forces that led to its creation. The reality is that the Court was created
by a group of nations loathe to relinquish power to a supranational body,
except in the area of human rights, which were on everyone’s mind in the
post-World War II era. Thus, the Court’s legitimacy may be due in part to
the discretion or, in its parlance, the margin of appreciation, it grants states
in matters about which a strong consensus has not yet emerged. When
evaluating whether a country’s laws violate the Convention, the Court
applies the doctrine of proportionality.
As its name suggests,
proportionality refers to the balance member states must strike between the
objectives of their laws and the means they choose to realize those
objectives.78 Proportionality requires that the restriction align closely with
the goal the restriction is intended to achieve.79 This standard does not
prohibit a state from passing laws in order to achieve ethical objectives
about which there may be disagreement, but it does prevent a legislature
from imposing restrictions that have too little to do with the achievement of
those normative goals.80 As the margin of appreciation narrows and the
demands of the proportionality standard increase, too loose a fit between a
law’s objective and the legal means chosen to bring that objective about
75. See id. at 13 (arguing that the European Court of Human Rights remains
internationally focused and fails to take up a form of constitutional authority in dealing
with certain Convention rights).
76. See id. at 14 (indicating the European Court of Human Rights would fail
without the support of the States).
77. See id. at 3 (referring to the Court’s consistent upgrades in areas of new rights,
increased powers, and improved communication); see also GOLDHABER, supra note 73,
at 2 (citing several leading jurists who praise the Court and Convention as the most
developed and best in the world).
78. See Arturas Panomariovas & Egidijus Losis, Proportionality: From the
Concept to the Procedure, 2 JURISPRUDENCE 257, 263 (2010) (defining proportionality
in jurisprudence as a means of justice focused on protecting individual rights).
79. See YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 225 (2002)
(providing that the goals of restrictions change over time, as does the proportionality
used to evaluate such restrictions).
80. See Richard F. Storrow, The Pluralism Problem in Cross Border Reproductive
Care, 25 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 2939 (2010) (indicating that proportionality is
required in order to achieve a balance between the goals and methods used to achieve
those goals).
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will constitute a violation of the Convention. Proportionality, then,
prevents majoritarian perspectives on volatile issues from automatically
smothering alternative points of view. By insisting on proportionality,
democracy respects autonomy in matters of great human importance and
strives to avoid the oppression of minority points of view. As R. Beddard
sees it, “[t]he difficulties of balancing the wishes of the individual and
those of the community as a whole are not to be underestimated and may
seem to encapsulate the major decision decision-making complexity of
human rights law.”81 The most difficult cases, in the view of one judge, are
cases involving conceptions of the family based in deeply rooted religious,
ideological, or traditional convictions.82
A case brought against Ireland on the question of illegitimacy of birth
probably best illustrates the difficulty of the Court’s task. Roy Johnston
was legally separated from his wife and had been living with his domestic
partner Janice Williams-Johnston and their daughter Nessa for a number of
years. In Ireland at the time of Johnston, only families based on marriage
received protection under the Constitution.83 Ireland also prohibited
divorce, the law reflecting a religious position in favor of permanent
marriage. In doing so, it ignored the reality of dependency that was so
evident in the Williams-Johnston’s living arrangement,84 requiring them to
take additional steps “to regularize their situation.”85 Furthermore, the law
denied them any means of solidifying their bond to account for their
interdependency or to remove the legal disabilities and stigma of
illegitimacy placed upon Nessa.
The law treated Nessa differently from children born in wedlock in a
number of significant ways. Although Janice Williams-Johnston was
recognized as Nessa’s legal mother for all purposes under the doctrine of
mater semper certa est,86 Tessa could inherit in intestacy from her mother
only if her mother had no legitimate children.87 Roy Johnston’s position
vis-à-vis Nessa was more tenuous. Although he was registered as the
child’s father, he had no “paternal affiliation” with Nessa and thus was

81. See RALPH BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 99 (3d ed. 1993)
(suggesting that the Strausbourg Court has a difficult responsibility in evaluating the
complex issues related to private life).
82. See Kroon and Others v. Netherlands, 19 E.H.R.R. 263, 287 (1995) (Morenilla
J., dissenting) (arguing cohesion of the family and preservation of the family unit
should not be overly interfered with by the State when recognizing natural father
rights).
83. Johnston v. Ireland, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, ¶ 28 (1987).
84. Id. ¶ 12.
85. Id. ¶¶ 12, 66, 71.
86. Id. ¶ 25.
87. Id. ¶ 31.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012

13

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 8

574

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:3

recognized as her father only for very limited purposes.88 For Nessa, this
meant that she was barred by law from inheriting in intestacy from her
father, a rule intended “to strengthen the protection of the family.”89
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the law relating to Nessa was that it
provided that she could not be legitimated since her parents could not have
been married to each other at either the time she was born or the time she
was conceived.90
The parties claimed violations of their right to private and family life and
to be free from discrimination. Although the Court made clear that, unlike
the Irish Constitution, the protections of the Convention extended to the
“‘illegitimate’ family,”91 it nonetheless determined that the Convention
guaranteed no right to divorce.92 This determination did not dispose of
Nessa’s claims, however. Quoting from its opinion in Marckx v. Belgium,
decided before the European consensus in favor of doing away with the
disparate treatment of nonmarital children was as solid as it was at the time
Johnston was decided, the Court reiterated the importance of state’s
establishing legal safeguards geared toward integrating nonmarital children
into their families. It held that Ireland’s affording Nessa and her parents no
means whatsoever to bring her treatment under the law into line with the
legal treatment of legitimate children amounted to a failure to respect the
Williams-Johnston’s family life.93 This was not meant to convey that
member states cannot go about expressing respect for family life in
different ways, just that they cannot allow a legal presumption to prevail
over a “biological and social reality.”94
A later case against the Netherlands, Kroon, raised the claim that the rule
disallowing a biological father from establishing his paternity of a child
where the mother of the child was married to a man who did not deny
paternity was a violation of the right to family life guaranteed by Article 8
of the Convention. In this case, the child Samir was born to Catharina and
Ali at a time when Catharina was still married to Omar, from whom she

88. Id. ¶¶ 11, 26.
89. Id. ¶ 31.
90. Id. ¶¶ 28, 70(c). Note the similarity of this rule to the treatment of “spurious”

illegitimates under Roman law. WITTE, supra note 3, at 53.
91. Johnston, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, ¶¶ 55(b), 56. Note the similarity to the
statement made in Michael H. v. Gerald D. that “[t]he family unit accorded traditional
respect in our society, which we have referred to as the ‘unitary family,’ is typified, of
course, by the marital family, but also includes the household of unmarried parents and
their children.” 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.3 (1989).
92. See Johnston, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, ¶¶ 54, 57 (providing there is no right to
divorce, although divorce is recognized under the Convention).
93. See id. ¶¶ 75, 76.
94. See Kroon and Others v. Netherlands, 297-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/8

14

Storrow: The Phantom Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and

2012]

PHANTOM CHILDREN OF THE REPUBLIC

575

was separated.95 Catharina thereafter divorced Omar,96 but neither she nor
Ali wished to be married.97 They thus could not pursue the option of
Omar’s adopting Samir as a stepparent. The government thereafter rejected
Catharina and Ali’s attempts to establish Ali’s paternity of Samir.98 Under
these circumstances, the law permitted Samir’s paternity to be established
only if Omar denied paternity,99 but Omar’s whereabouts were unknown.100
Ali and Catharina subsequently had three other children.101 Although the
Court was sensitive to the margin of appreciation that the state enjoys in
these matters and that a “fair balance must be struck between the
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole,”
nonetheless “[w]here the existence of a family tie with a child has been
established, the state must act in a manner calculated to enable that tie to be
developed” and for the child to be integrated within the family.102 In
Netherlands’ refusal to do so, the Court found far too rigid an application
of the marital presumption of paternity.103 The possibility of adoption was
deemed not to be “sufficient to eliminate the effects on their private and
family life created by the impossibility to contest the legal paternity.”104
The Kroon and Johnston cases stand for the proposition that “Article 8 is
not confined solely to marriage-based relationships”105 because family life
may have biological and social realities and components that have nothing
to do with marriage.106 Among these may figure, living together107 and
“other factors [that would] serve to demonstrate that a relationship has
sufficient constancy.”108 These cases illustrate the robust protection the
European Convention on Human Rights guarantees children born out of
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. ¶¶ 7-9.
See id. ¶ 9.
See id. ¶ 30.
See id. ¶¶ 10, 11-14.
See id. ¶¶ 10, 18.
See id. ¶ 8.
See id. ¶ 15.
See id. ¶ 36.

103. See id. ¶ 31. We can readily see how Kroon stands in opposition to Michael
H., since it essentially holds that a natural father has the right to challenge the
presumption undergirding a legal father’s paternity.
104. See id. ¶ 42.
105. See id. ¶ 31.
106. See id. ¶¶ 30, 40.
107. See Berrehab v. The Netherlands, App. No. 10730/84 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988)
(establishing that cohabitation is not required for family life between parents and minor
children).
108. See Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 47486/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010)
(recognizing that the existence of family ties in the United Kingdom meant that a
Pakistani national who had moved to the United Kingdom could not be deported).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012

15

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 8

576

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:3

wedlock and their families against discriminatory laws.
Indeed
illegitimacy now constitutes a “suspect category” calling for the most
intense level of review.109 Yutaka Arai comments:
Another area in which an audacious approach is consistently applied is in
discrimination against “illegitimate” children. As in issues of gender
quality, the effective use of evolutive interpretation and the stringent
examination of justifications for any differential treatment demonstrate
an assertive policy of review. The Strasbourg organs are willing to
impose a weighty burden of proof on a respondent State. In relation to
this suspect category as well, the scope of the margin shrinks to the
vanishing point.110

B. The United States Supreme Court
The law in the United States has evolved in the last twenty-five years to
recognize that innocent children should not suffer disinheritance as a result
of their parents’ indiscretions.111 This reform in the law arose largely due
to a mandate from the United States Supreme Court making clear that
classifications based on a child’s nonmarital status that do not substantially
relate to important legislative goals violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.112 Legislatures responded to this mandate by
enacting statutory frameworks that align the treatment accorded nonmarital
children with that accorded marital children.113 Despite this sea change in
the inheritance rights of nonmarital children, the law continues to favor
marital relationships in this context. Only parents unwed at the time of
their child’s birth are deprived of the opportunity to inherit from that child
unless they recognize or support the child. The law continues to
disadvantage nonmarital children in other ways as well.114
109. See TAKAHASHI, supra note 79, at 225.
110. Id. at 224 (citations omitted).
111. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“[I]mposing

disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is
an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent. Courts are
powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the
Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to
status of birth where . . . the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest,
compelling or otherwise.”).
112. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Between these extremes of
rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which
generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or
illegitimacy.”).
113. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriage at the Millennium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 647,
659 (1999) (stating that illegitimacy is not a suspect constitutional classification, so that
children of unmarried parents enjoy most of the benefits available to those whose
parents are married).
114. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(2) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508(2)
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Under the common law, a nonmarital child could inherit from neither her
mother nor her father.115 Most states have passed laws allowing nonmarital
children to inherit from their mothers,116 but, by and large, nonmarital
children still face legal obstacles to inheriting from their fathers.117 This
disparate treatment was not ameliorated, as some courts claimed,118 by the
existence of the father’s power at any time to execute a will naming his
nonmarital child a beneficiary.119 Not only was the use of “children” in a
will construed so as to exclude illegitimate children,120 but state statutes
deprived a nonmarital child of specific bequests from his parents either per
se121 or upon challenge by the testator’s surviving spouse and marital
children.122 The Supreme Court, in Labine v. Vincent,123 rejected a
constitutional challenge to these statutes, reasoning that it had no authority
(2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-109(b) (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
391.105(1)(c)(2) (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(2)(iii) (West
2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(i) (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060.2(2)
(West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309(2)(ii) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2109(2)(ii) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. §
64.1-5.1(3)(b) (2012) (denying fathers’ inheritance rights through their nonmarital
progeny unless they support or acknowledge them); Maldonado, supra note 29, at 345
(documenting the continuing social stigma of illegitimacy and the continuing legal
discrimination in the area of postsecondary education support, immigration and
intestate succession).
115. See In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 236 (Ill. 1975) (citing 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *456 (“Under the common law an illegitimate was
considered filius nullius [the child of nobody].”)); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 115 (2009).
116. See In re Karas, 329 N.E.2d at 237 (quoting Smith v. Garber, 121 N.E. 173,
175 (Ill. 1918)).
117. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 115, at 115. In Trimble, the Court described these
new laws as attempting to establish a system of intestate inheritance more just to
illegitimate children and, at the same time, protecting against spurious claims of
paternity. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1976).
118. See, e.g., In re Karas, 329 N.E.2d at 240.
119. See In re Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (La. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Brown v. Brown, 450 U.S. 998 (1981).
120. See Brisbin v. Huntington, 103 N.W. 144, 147 (Iowa 1905) (“The decisions are
unanimous that, in the absence of statutory provisions modifying the common law with
respect to illegitimate children, the words ‘issue,’ ‘child,’ or ‘children,’ found in a will
or statute, whether qualified by the word ‘lawful’ or not, are to be construed as only
those who are legitimate, and, if others are intended, this must be deduced from the
language employed, without resort to extrinsic facts.”).
121. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 n.13 (1971) (citing LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 1488 (1870) (repealed 1978) (noting the alimentary limitation for
adulterous or incestuous children).
122. See Gore v. Clarke, 16 S.E. 614, 616 (S.C. 1892) (citing a statute declaring
void any bequest of more than one-fourth of a testator’s estate to that testator’s
illegitimate child “provided the wife or child alone can raise the question”); Bennett v.
Toler, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 588 (1860) (“[I]n a great majority of cases the testator is
presumed to prefer, as objects of his bounty, legitimate children to bastards.”).
123. See Labine, 401 U.S. at 532 (holding that a state’s interest in promoting family
life rationally supports its disallowance of an intestate share for an unacknowledged
illegitimate child).
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to interfere with a state’s intestate succession laws124 and that these laws
were rationally based on the desire of states to encourage family
relationships.125
After deciding no fewer than nine disputes involving wrongful death and
public benefits statutes containing classifications based on illegitimacy,126
the Supreme Court, in Trimble v. Gordon,127 reviewed an Illinois intestate
succession statute that disallowed illegitimate children from inheriting from
their biological fathers.128 The case was an appeal by a nonmarital child
from the probate court’s rejection of her petition to be declared an heir of
her father’s estate.129 The Supreme Court of Illinois, ruling orally from the
bench immediately after oral argument, affirmed the decision.130
While not overruling Labine, the Trimble Court indirectly disapproved
of it,131 stating that other decisions had expressly provided that no “State
may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing
sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships.”132 The
Court also hinted that Labine may have gone too far in approving, based on
the state’s asserted interest in the orderly administration of estates, the
complete exclusion of nonmarital children from intestate inheritance.133
Likewise, the Court expressed its view that proof problems in inheritance
claims by nonmarital children should not be used to excuse invidious
discrimination against them.134 Finally, the Trimble Court deemed the fact
that the father could have made a will and the claim that the intestacy
statute reflected his “presumed intent” wholly irrelevant to the question at
hand.135
As radical as Trimble seemed, it, nonetheless, did not stand for the
proposition that, to inherit from their intestate fathers, nonmarital children
must have precisely the same rights as marital children. The Court
124. Id.
125. See id. at 536 n.6.
126. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 n.11 (1976) (citing cases). See

generally Susan E. Satava, Discrimination Against the Unacknowledged Illegitimate
Child and the Wrongful Death Statute, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 933, 939-69 (1996)
(summarizing cases and contexts).
127. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 762.
128. See id. at 764-65 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1975) (current version at
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 2-1 (West 2012)).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 765.
131. See id. at 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Note, however, that four justices
dissented in Trimble, deeming Labine dispositive.
132. See id. at 769 (majority opinion).
133. See id. at 767 n.12.
134. See id. at 772.
135. Id. at 774-75.
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admitted that difficulties in proving paternity “might justify a more
demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers’
estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under
their mothers’ estates or for legitimate children generally.”136 The Court,
thus, left room for a veritable welter of new litigation presenting the
question of when the different standard would become too demanding to
pass constitutional muster.137
Both New York and Texas defended their particularly demanding
standards in cases reaching the Supreme Court. New York’s statute
provided that nonmarital children could not inherit in intestacy from their
fathers unless, during the father’s lifetime, a court issued an order of
filiation initiated during the mother’s pregnancy or before the child’s
second birthday.138 This provision was challenged in Lalli v. Lalli139 by the
son of an intestate father who openly had acknowledged his paternity.140 In
declaring New York’s statute constitutional,141 albeit imperfect,142 the
Court noted that its purpose was not to steer people into legitimate
relationships143 but to promote the orderly administration of estates.144 The
Court commented that, because the unexpected appearance of a nonmarital
child claiming a share of an estate could disrupt the stability of orderly
administration,145 New York’s restriction on the ability of nonmarital
children to inherit was justified. Also compelling to the Court were the
peculiar proof problems that paternity posed. Whereas maternity is a
foregone conclusion in most cases, questions of paternity invite fraudulent
claims and harassing litigation146—especially where fathers and their
nonmarital children do not constitute “a formal family unit.”147 The Court
felt that these important concerns were addressed appropriately by New
York’s statutory scheme because it required the filiation order to be issued
during the putative father’s lifetime.148 This circumscribed the time within
136. Id. at 770; cf. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986) (“[T]he state[’s]
interest in the orderly disposition of decedents’ estates may justify the imposition of
special requirements upon an illegitimate child.”).
137. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266 (1978).
138. See id. at 261 n.2 (citing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(2)
(McKinney 1998)).
139. Id. at 259.
140. Id. at 262-63.
141. Id. at 276.
142. Id. at 272-73.
143. See id. at 267 (“[T]he marital status of the parents is irrelevant.”).
144. Id. at 267-68.
145. Id. at 270.
146. Id. at 271.
147. Id. at 269.
148. See id. at 271 (arguing that the accurate resolution of paternity claims is
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which illegitimate children could present their claims and allowed the
putative father to defend himself against false claims of paternity.149 The
Lalli Court did not address the constitutionality of the statute’s two-year
limitation specifically,150 a choice Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence,
suggested would haunt the Court as legislatures questioned whether their
particular statutes were more like the one in Trimble or the one in Lalli.151
In dissent, four justices argued that the decision was an unjustified
retreat from Trimble in that it made it likely that nonmarital children would
never inherit from their fathers in intestacy.152 As if responding to this
dissent, later New York cases specifically found the statute’s two-year
requirement unconstitutional.153 Since its amendment in 1981, New York’s
statutory scheme has allowed, in addition to the court order of filiation,154 a
nonmarital child to inherit from his natural father if the father: (1) “has
signed an instrument acknowledging paternity,”155 (2) “paternity has been
established by clear and convincing evidence and the father of the child has
openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own,”156 or (3)
“paternity has been established by clear and convincing evidence . . .
derived from a genetic marker test.”157 These criteria incorporate some of
the suggestions Justice Brennan made in his dissent in Lalli and reflect the
statutory scheme that many states, including Texas, subsequently have
adopted.158
enhanced by adjudicating these claims during the putative father’s lifetime).
149. See id. at 271-72 (showing that permitting the putative father to “defend his
reputation” and respond to a paternity claim facilitates the administration of his estate
and minimizes the success of fraudulent assertions of paternity).
150. See id. at 267 n.5 (explaining that the constitutionality of the two-year
limitation is not at issue because the appellant never commenced a paternity
proceeding).
151. See id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that until Trimble is
overruled, the validity of related statutes is questionable until courts evaluate them one
by one).
152. See id. at 277-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that it is unimaginable
under the New York statute that nonmarital children who are acknowledged and
voluntarily supported by their fathers “would ever inherit intestate”).
153. See, e.g., In re McLeod, 430 N.Y.S.2d 782, 785 (Sur. Ct. 1980); In re Harris,
414 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (Sur. Ct. 1979) (“[I]f a literal and stringent application of the
two year limitation . . . were accepted, it would require a finding that this portion of the
statute is constitutionally offensive to the right of the infant to equal protection of the
law.”); In re Angelis, 410 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524 (Sur. Ct. 1978).
154. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2)(A) (McKinney 2012).
155. Id. § 4-1.2(a)(2)(B).
156. Id. § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C)(ii).
157. Id. § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C)(i).
158. Many of these statutes track the language of the Uniform Parentage Act. See
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(2)-(3) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001) (stating
a paternity is established through an effective acknowledgement of paternity by the
father or through adjudication of the man’s paternity).
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Texas was particularly recalcitrant in preventing nonmarital children
from claiming a paternal inheritance and has had a history of other
draconian laws disfavoring illegitimate children.159 In 1977, the year
Trimble was decided, Texas still had a statute depriving an illegitimate
child of any claim to a paternal inheritance unless her parents had married
after her birth.160 In 1978, Delynda Reed, born out of wedlock, claimed a
share of the estate of her father Prince Ricker, who had died four months
before Trimble was decided.161 The Texas courts denied her claim, ruling
that Trimble did not operate retroactively to encompass claims to estates
opened before the decision in Trimble but distributed afterwards.162 The
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that, although the claim of a nonmarital
child to a share in her father’s estate may impose upon the child “special
requirements,”163 the timing of Reed’s claim had no impact on the state’s
interest in the orderly administration of Ricker’s estate.
In response to Trimble and later cases, the Texas legislature passed a
series of amendments to both the Texas Probate Code and the Texas
Family Code. In 1977, the Texas legislature amended the Texas Probate
Code to allow a nonmarital child to claim a paternal inheritance only if the
parents had married after the child’s birth or the father voluntarily had
legitimated the child.164 In 1979, the legislature again amended the Texas
Probate Code to allow the child to be legitimated by a court order of
paternity provided for by the Texas Family Code.165 Despite this reform,
Texas’s statute of limitations for a nonmarital child’s paternity action
required the child to bring the action before her first birthday, a
requirement characterized as “less than generous” in Mills v. Habluetzel,166
159. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (striking down Texas’s rule
disallowing illegitimates a right of support from their biological fathers, as an
unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause). In Mills v. Habluetzel, the
Supreme Court’s follow-up to Gomez, the Court struck down, as a violation of equal
protection, a Texas statute of limitations requiring a nonmarital child to bring a suit for
support before reaching his first birthday. 446 U.S. 91, 101 (1982). The Court held
that the truncated limitations period afforded nonmarital children no reasonable
opportunity to assert their claims and bore no substantial relationship to the state’s
interest in frustrating stale or fraudulent claims of paternity. See id. at 100-01.
160. See Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 853 (1986) (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 42 (Vernon 1956) (stating that a nonmarital child whose parents never married could
only inherit “from his mother and from his maternal kindred . . . .”)).
161. See id.
162. See id. at 853 n.3 (citing Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex. App.
1984)). Texas courts apparently had applied Trimble to claims pending as of the date
of the decision. See Reed, 682 S.W.2d at 856 (citing Winn v. Lackey, 618 S.W.2d 910
(Tex. App. 1981); Lovejoy v. Lillie, 569 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App. 1978)).
163. See Reed, 476 U.S. at 855.
164. See Dickson v. Simpson, 807 S.W.2d 726, 726-727 (Tex. 1991).
165. See id. at 727.
166. 456 U.S. 91, 94 (1982).
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a Supreme Court case striking it down as a violation of equal protection.167
While Mills was pending before the Supreme Court, the Texas legislature
increased the limit to age four, and, in 1983, the legislature again increased
the time frame to two years after a child becomes an adult.168 The Texas
Probate Code was amended in 1987 to provide for post-death
determinations of paternity in the probate court,169 and, finally, in 1989, the
legislature again amended the Texas Family Code to make the more liberal
statute of limitations passed in 1983 applicable to “children for whom a
paternity action was brought but dismissed because a statute of limitations
of less than eighteen years was in effect.”170 The present law reflecting this
series of amendments allows nonmarital children to bring a paternity suit
within two years of their reaching the age of majority or, “without regard to
a paternity determination under the Family Code or voluntary
legitimization by the father,”171 to establish paternity by clear and
convincing evidence in the probate court172 either in the course of an
existing probate173 or by attacking a judgment of heirship within four
years.174 These statutes of limitations were, like the limitations imposed by
the statute in Lalli, justified by Texas’s interest in the “orderly
administration” of estates and the validity of property ownership.175
These legislative reforms suggest that the contemporary view that there
are no illegitimate children, only illegitimate parents,176 has led to abolition
of the long-standing bias in favor of nuclear families that perpetuated the
stigma of illegitimacy. But instead of completely abolishing this bias,
167. Id. at 101.
168. See In re Sicko, 900 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. App. 1995).
169. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1) (West 2012); Turner v. Nesby, 848

S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. App. 1993).
170. In re Sicko, 900 S.W.2d at 865 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01(b) (West
Supp. 1995) (repealed 1995)).
171. Id. at 866.
172. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1).
173. See In re Chavana, 993 S.W.2d 311, 317 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating that because
the right to inherit is separate from the right to establish paternity, and to seek financial
support can only be determined after the putative father has died, the action must be
brought at the time of probate).
174. See Turner, 848 S.W.2d at 878 (holding that the plain language of section 55(a)
of the Texas Probate Code necessitates that the four-year statute of limitations for an
heir to contest a judgment of heirship begins to run at the time of the judgment).
175. See Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 856 (1986) (announcing retroactive
application of Trimble to the Texas Probate Code).
176. See In re Cherkas, 506 A.2d 1029, 1031 (R.I. 1986) (“The sweep of the various
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States in this area may be summarized by
a statement of principle widely accepted in the modern era. Although there may be
illegitimate parents, there is, in justice, no such person as an illegitimate child. The
very term ‘bastard’ is illustrative of the medieval notion that the sins of the father
would be visited upon his hapless offspring. If such a concept was ever accepted, it is
time, and past time, that it be wholly discredited and repudiated.”).
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states have elected to shift the stigma of illegitimacy from illegitimate
children to their parents and, in this way, have found a new means of
promoting nuclear families. Prevented by the Supreme Court on equal
protection grounds from disfavoring nonmarital children, several states
have passed legislation denying fathers inheritance rights from or through
their nonmarital progeny unless they supported or acknowledged such
children.177 Determining that fathers who do not treat their nonmarital
children as their own have no entitlement to inherit from those children’s
estates, the Georgia legislature enacted such a statute.178 The statute
disallowed the father of a nonmarital child from inheriting from or through
that child if paternity had not been established through presumption or
court order, or if the father “failed or refused openly to treat the child as his
own or failed or refused to provide support for the child.”179 The statute
also expressly recognized the right of a nonmarital child’s mother to inherit
from the child under any circumstances,180 and it made no mention of
married parents who abandon their children.
The statute was invoked by the plaintiff in Rainey v. Chever.181 In that
case, Robert Lee Chever’s twenty-year-old nonmarital child was killed in
an automobile accident.182 Zenobia Hamilton Rainey, the child’s mother,
moved the court to deny the child’s father heirship status even though his
paternity had been established.183 Chever, who apparently never had
supported his son or played any role in his son’s life,184 responded by
challenging the statute on federal and state equal protection grounds.185
The trial court agreed with Chever, and the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed, noting that the statutory means chosen to advance the state’s
interest in encouraging fathers to take responsibility for their nonmarital
children were not substantially related to the classification that penalized
fathers but not similarly situated mothers.186
The Supreme Court denied certiorari over the strenuous dissent of
Justice Thomas, who, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,
described a host of social ills attributable to the high incidence of out-of177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-4 (1997) (amended 2002).
Id. § 53-2-4(b)(2).
Id. § 53-2-4(a).
510 S.E.2d 823, 823 (Ga. 1999).
Id.
Id.
See Rainey v. Chever, 527 U.S. 1044, 1045 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing how Chever did not meet his son until he was fifteen years old and had
never initiated a visit with his son).
185. Rainey, 510 S.E.2d at 823.
186. See id. at 824.
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wedlock births.187 Claiming that the Georgia Supreme Court had failed to
adhere to Supreme Court precedent,188 Justice Thomas declared that the
court should have defined the issue as whether a distinction between fathers
who do and fathers who do not support and acknowledge their nonmarital
children had a rational basis.189 Based on this statement of the issue,
Justice Thomas concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court improperly had
applied heightened scrutiny in its review of the statute’s constitutionality.190
Although the opinion of the dissenting justices has no legal force, it is
remarkable that both it and the Georgia Supreme Court’s opinion never
fully explored the distinction between classifications stigmatizing
nonmarital children and those stigmatizing their parents. This distinction
was reflected, if not fully appreciated, in two decisions the Supreme Court
made early in its history of invalidating legislation denying entitlements
because of illegitimacy.
In Levy v. Louisiana,191 the Court struck down Louisiana’s denial of
standing to nonmarital children who wished to sue for the wrongful death
of their parent.192 The Court found no rational relationship between the
prohibition and the lower court’s assertion that it discouraged “bringing
children into the world out of wedlock.”193 In Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,194 recognized as the reverse of
Levy,195 the Court struck down a classification disallowing a mother from
187. See Rainey, 527 U.S. at 1044 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (providing an expert’s
view that out-of-welock births can lead to “lower newborn health and increased risk of
early infant death; retarded cognitive and verbal development; lowered educational
achievement; lowered levels of job attainment; increased behavioral problems; lowered
ability to control impulses; warped social development; increased dependence on
welfare; increased exposure to crime; and increased risk of being physically or sexually
abused”).
188. See id. at 1046 (claiming the state court decision to be “inconsistent with this
court’s prior decisions”).
189. See id. (demonstrating that the Court has analyzed similar cases under rational
basis review, therefore the lower court’s use of strict scrutiny was in error); cf. Parham
v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 n.7 (1979) (“[T]he Georgia statute at issue here excludes
only those fathers who have not legitimated their children.”); Alvarez v. Dist. Dir. of
INS, 539 F.2d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 1976) (asserting that strict scrutiny in the alien
context is not required when classifications are made within groups of aliens rather
than between aliens and citizens).
190. See Rainey, 527 U.S. at 1047 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
192. Id. at 70 (reasoning that because nonmarital children are “clearly ‘persons’
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
they have standing to sue for the wrongful death of their parent).
193. Id. at 72.
194. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
195. See Burnett v. Camden, 254 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. 1970) (describing how Levy
involved non-marital children who brought action for the wrongful death of their
mother, while Glona involved a mother bringing action for the wrongful death of her
son).
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suing for the wrongful death of her nonmarital child.196 As in Levy, the
Court found the prohibition irrational, remarking: “It would, indeed, be
farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so they can be
compensated in damages for their death.”197 Oddly, many courts
discussing Glona have described it as a decision striking down an
illegitimacy classification.198 But because the nonmarital child in the case
had died, the classification was not based on illegitimacy but on the
plaintiff’s marital status at the time of her child’s birth.199 Such
classifications do not receive the heightened scrutiny that illegitimacy
classifications do and might have no difficulty surviving rational basis
review, the most limited scope of review.200 Still, although the rational
basis standard is highly deferential, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause
prohibits ‘arbitrary and irrational discrimination’ even if no suspect class or

196. Glona, 391 U.S. at 76 (holding that when a state withholds relief to a mother
because her child was born out-of-wedlock, it denies equal protection under the law).
197. Id. at 75; cf. Hughes v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 867, 871 (Ga. 1978) (Hill, J.,
dissenting) (“The denial of a claim for a child’s wrongful death does not promote the
family as an institution for rearing that child in a timely or rational manner regardless
of the level of scrutiny employed.”), aff’d, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (“It is thus neither
illogical nor unjust for society to express its ‘condemnation of irresponsible liaisons
beyond the bonds of marriage’ by not conferring upon a biological father the statutory
right to sue for the wrongful death of his illegitimate child.”).
198. See, e.g., Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1404 (3d Cir. 1997)
(classifying Glona as a case addressing a legislative classification based on “having
been born out of wedlock”); Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp.,
425 F.2d 834, 836 (2d Cir. 1969) (“In Levy and Glona the Court had no problem of
defeating reasonable expectations that any party had entertained in the past. It held
merely that the illegitimacy of the plaintiff or the decedent was not a constitutionally
adequate defense to a wrongful death action.”); Peterson v. Norton, 395 F. Supp. 1351,
1355 (D. Conn. 1975) (grouping Glona with other Supreme Court decisions involving
“classifications on the basis of legitimacy of birth”); Poulos v. McMahan, 297 S.E.2d
451, 452 (Ga. 1982) (characterizing Glona as “present[ing] with the issue of whether a
statutory discrimination against illegitimate children is constitutional”); Burnett v.
Camden, 254 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. 1970) (describing the classification in Glona by
“the fact that the child was born out-of-wedlock”).
199. See Parham, 441 U.S. at 355 n.7 (“The invidious discrimination perceived in
[Glona] was between married and unmarried mothers.”).
200. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (explaining that
rational basis review defers to legislative judgment and demands no evidence or
empirical data in support of legislation); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992)
(explaining that rational basis review merely requires that a “purpose may conceivably
or may reasonably have been the purpose and policy” of the legislature (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“Only in an exceptional circumstance will a statute not be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest and be found unconstitutional under rational basis
scrutiny.”); Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999)
(characterizing rational basis review as “extremely deferential”). Challenges based on
rational basis rarely succeed. Farrell, supra, at 357 (“In the past twenty-five years, the
Court has decided ten such cases, while during the same time period, it has rejected
rational basis arguments on one hundred occasions.”).
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fundamental right is implicated.”201 Accordingly, it is conceivable that the
Court would disapprove of a statute that establishes marriage as a proxy for
the support of marital children and that requires the unmarried to make an
independent showing of support for their children.202 Marriage is, after all,
no guarantee that parents will support their children. Even if an unwed
father took steps to legitimate his child, his failure to support his child
would have to be addressed by invoking the state’s enforcement machinery.
The same is true of married fathers who fail to support their legitimate
children. Denying one set of parents’ inheritance rights for non-support of
their children but not similarly depriving married parents who do not
support their children stigmatizes the unmarried and runs counter to a broad
reading of Eisenstadt and other Supreme Court decisions.203 By failing to
recognize the Georgia statute’s marital status discrimination in Rainey, the
Georgia Supreme Court implied that the Georgia legislature could cure the
equal protection flaw in the statute by imposing the same deprivation of
inheritance rights on women who bear children out of wedlock as was
imposed on men. By not granting certiorari in Rainey, the United States
Supreme Court left several indistinguishable statutes in other states
untouched. In so doing, the Court resurrected its former justification for
not striking down statutes stigmatizing illegitimate children and thereby
201. Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 309 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(“The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”).
202. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 552-53 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“It is also important not to obscure the fact that the formality of marriage primarily
signifies a relationship between husband and wife, not between parent and child.
Analysis of the rationality of any state effort to impose obligations based upon the fact
of marriage must, therefore, distinguish between those obligations that run between
parties to the marriage and those that run to others.”); JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE
FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 99, 117 (1997)
(suggesting the Court’s position in unwed father cases is driven less by the concern that
fathers establish relationships with their children than that they establish a connection
to the mothers of their children); Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 339, 342 (1996) (“Although reproduction within marriage serves as the
best proxy for responsible reproduction in this discourse, and nonmarital reproduction
for irresponsible reproduction, such models prove to be both over- and
underinclusive.”).
The Supreme Court has declined to analyze such claims. See, e.g., Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116-17 (1989) (“We do not reach Michael’s equal protection
claim, however, as it was neither raised nor passed upon below.”); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 n.16 (1979) (declining to address an equal protection
claim founded on differential treatment of married and unmarried fathers). But see
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (finding compelling distinctions between
unmarried and married fathers based on the latter’s having “borne full responsibility for
the rearing of [their] children during the period of the marriage”).
203. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing the illegitimacy
classification case, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (“[T]he law [has not]
refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage
ceremony.”)).
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perpetuated the law’s continued promotion of marital families.
It has been a long road to legislative reforms aimed at advancing the
contemporary view that there are no illegitimate children, only illegitimate
parents, and erasing the stigma surrounding illegitimacy of birth.
Nonetheless, when illegitimacy as a status fell into disfavor, the result was
not to strike down laws criminalizing sexual activity between consenting
adults but roughly to equalize the treatment of non-marital and marital
children. As a quasi-suspect classification qualifying only for intermediate
scrutiny, children born out of wedlock are still subject to differential
treatment that significantly advances the state’s interest in the orderly
administration of estates.
The long history of the legal treatment of nonmarital children reveals not
only opprobrium aimed at the behavior of their parents but also, at the very
least, some measure of hatred and suspicion toward the children
themselves. By some accounts, they are interlopers, subhuman, unworthy
of civil status, and even loathed by their own parents. There is no question
that nonmarital children have suffered stigma by virtue of the lawless
circumstances of their birth. Indeed, illegitimacy classifications themselves
and the codification of differential treatment based on them have inspired
some states to declare nonmarital children a suspect class.204 At the very
least, the courts have recognized that discrimination against nonmarital
children is not merely regrettable but is in fact invidious.
II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND ILLEGITIMACY
A. Biblical Roots
Illegitimacy as a status is rooted in an ancient story of assisted
reproduction. The biblical story of Abraham, Sarah, and their servant
Hagar is essentially the story of an infertile woman who wanted children
and invoked the custom of permitting her husband to have children by his
slave. Abraham impregnated Hagar, who later gave birth to Ishmael. All
was well until Sarah unexpectedly became pregnant and gave birth to Isaac.
Her fortunes having turned in a new direction, Sarah prevailed upon
Abraham to banish Hagar and Ishmael, who wandered in the desert until
they were near death. In this story and other passages of the Bible,
“Christian theologians and jurists alike found . . . ample sanction for the
legal doctrine of illegitimacy.”205
204. See generally Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (noting that Texas had a
law separating illegitimate children from legitimate children into a class, which denied
right of parental support).
205. WITTE, supra note 3, at 4. Although his birth resulted from a custom of the
Jewish people, the later Christian church described Ishmael as a spurious illegitimate.
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The story of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar, read in modern terms, has a
number of ugly associations that taint our notion of what surrogacy could
be. First, it associates surrogates with poor, enslaved women, forced to
bear children for others and then discarded. Such visions stoke the
concerns about exploitation that have been so prominent in debates about
the ethics of surrogacy206 and resound in news headlines about the darkest
manifestation of surrogacy: human trafficking.207 Second, it supports the
stereotypical idea of “greedy” commissioning parents who are incapable of
full devotion to children not genetically related to themselves. Sarah
manifests perhaps the worst of this quality, rejecting the child she had
intended to rear once the opportunity for genetic parenthood presented
itself. In short, the biblical surrogacy story is about one-dimensional
women toiling in the shadow of patriarchy, either powerless and exploited
or demanding and opportunistic. A worse template for surrogacy could
scarcely be imagined. The repugnance we bear toward the slavery,
oppression of women, child abuse, betrayal, opportunism, and narcissism is
undoubtedly the emotional fuel behind certain calls to reject surrogacy as a
means of becoming parents.
B. Contemporary Manifestations
Nothing about the biblical surrogacy story resembles modern day
surrogacy arrangements. Nonetheless, assisted reproduction has been
associated with adultery and illegitimacy since its inception. This
association is most salient in cases of alternative insemination by donor and
surrogacy.
1. Alternative Insemination by Donor
Although there are reports of alternative insemination being conducted
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, alternative insemination
began to be more widely used during the 1950s, when, during the Korean
War, soldiers banked their sperm for later use by their wives.208 Artificial
Id. at 68. The early church, by contrast, presented the story as an allegory instead of a
story about illicit sex. See id. at 40-42.
206. See generally Stephen Wilkinson, The Exploitation Argument Against
Commercial Surrogacy, 17 BIOETHICS 169 (2003) (exploring the basis for arguments
that commercial surrogacy is exploitative and raising the question of whether
commercial surrogacy should be prohibited even if it is determined not to be
exploitative).
207. See Michael Cook, Surrogate Baby Ring Busted in Bangkok, BIOEDGE (Feb.
25,
2011,
11:16
PM),
http://www.bioedge.org/index.php/bioethics/
bioethics_article/9413/ (describing a commercial surrogacy company whose practices
included restricting the movement of surrogate mothers and confiscating their
passports).
208. MARICRUZ DE LA TORRE VARGAS, LA FECUNDACIÓN IN VITRO Y LA FILIACIÓN
12 (1993).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/8

28

Storrow: The Phantom Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and

2012]

PHANTOM CHILDREN OF THE REPUBLIC

589

insemination by donor became more familiar in the 1960s.209 By the mid1970s, judicial decisions and, later, legislation210 began to appear regarding
the legality of, the legal requirements for (regulation of practices and
access: payment, anonymity, administration by physician or in hospital)211
or the legal consequences (filiation,212 illegitimacy,213 grounds for
divorce,214 and insurance215) of what we now call alternative insemination
209. Charles Kindregan, Jr., Thinking about the Law of Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 27 WIS. J. FAM. L. 123, 123 (2007), available at
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Family_Law_Section&TEMPLAT
E=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=75102.
210. 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 181 (1983). There was some case law prior to
1968. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
(citing Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963), People ex rel. Abajian v.
Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958), and Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Sup. Ct. 1948)) (holding husband liable for support for children born via artificial
insemination where husband consented in writing to the insemination of his wife with
the sperm of a donor); see also G. D. Walker, Legitimacy and Paternity, 14 ARK. L.
REV. 55, 58 (1960).
211. 1977 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 53 (1977) (Yugoslavia, among other
provisions, barring payment to sperm donors), 1978 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 12; 9
ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 155-56 (1982) (comprehensive regulations promulgated in
Czechoslovakia); 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 157-58 (1982) (Hungary Ministry of
Health ordinance and obstetrics, gynaecology and urology societies’ circular governing
“the selection and examination of donors and recipients for artificial insemination”).
212. See 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 175-76 (1983) (German court determined
that time had expired beyond which husband could contest paternity of child born by
AID to which husband consented); 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 154-55 (1982)
(Czechoslovakia); 1980 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 168 (Yugoslavia); 1976 ANN. REV.
POPULATION L. 105-06 (French court ruled husband could renounce his paternity even
if he had consented to his wife’s medical insemination by donor); M. Mandofia & M.
Buergisser, Les difficultés de réglementer la procréation assistée, 13 DÉVIANCE ET
SOCIÉTÉ 257, 258 (1989) (Switz.). Such laws coincided with the enactment of similar
laws in the individual U.S states and the Canadian provinces. 9 ANN. REV.
POPULATION L. 95 (Québec); 1976 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 114-116 (Connecticut).
213. See Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410-11 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (noting that a
child born through heterologous artificial insemination by a third party donor is not
considered born in wedlock and is therefore illegitimate); L. v. L., 1 All. E.R. 141
(1949) (Eng.) (holding in an annulment action that the child of a married couple was
illegitimate because although the wife became pregnant by intrauterine insemination,
the marriage was not consummated); 9 ANN. REP. POPULATION L. 152 (1982) (South
African court determines child born via artificial insemination to be illegitimate); Kelly
L. Frey, Comment, New Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem and a
Solution, 49 TENN. L. REV. 303, 313-17 (1982) (discussing Doornbos v. Doornbos
where the court held that “AID, even with the consent of the husband, is an act of
adultery and that the offspring of AID are illegitimate” (citation omitted)); M.L.
Lupton, Status of Children Born by Artificial Insemination in South African Law, 1985
J. S. AFR. L. 277, 279 (1985) (“[T]he father of an AID or IVF . . . child who had treated
the child as his own for years and who had given his consent to its conception could
assert his non-paternity as a defence to a claim for maintenance.”).
214. See Orford v. Orford (1921), 58 D.L.R. 251-52 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.)
(considering artificial insemination without the husband’s permission to be adultery);
K. Stoyanovitch, La légitimité des enfants nés par suite de l’insemination artificielle en
France et aux Etats-Unis d’Amerique, 8 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE
264, 267-68, 270-71 (1956) (Fr.).
215. See 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 176-77 (1983) (Germany); 8 ANN. REV.
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but what was then widely known as artificial insemination. By the late
1980s we can discern a full-fledged academic discussion about the law and
ethics of assisted reproduction.
Alternative insemination (AI) by donor inspired restrictive rules in
several countries around the world. Czechoslovakia permitted AI only for
“health reasons” such as male-factor infertility, defects of the female
organs, risk of hereditary disease, or “evolutionary defects”216 and barred
women over thirty-five years of age from access to the technology.217 The
couple had to submit an application and pay a fee. Donors of semen could
not be older than forty, and anonymity was strictly required.218 Hungary
required donors not only to undergo a test for hereditary disease but also a
psychological examination.219
Significant attention was paid during this early period to whether
children born via alternative insemination by donor (AID) would be
legitimate, even if born to a married woman.220 In part, the issue involved
the “paradox” of an AID child’s being born to the marriage but not being
the product of adultery.221 But courts have reached widely varying decision
on both the question of adultery and of illegitimacy. At least two courts
sidestepped the paradox by declaring AID to be adultery that causes the
resulting child to be illegitimate.222 The Orford court, on this account,
reasoned that an adulterous act does not consist of sexual penetration in
such cases but lies in “the invasion of the reproductive function.”223 The
court, however, suggested that illegitimacy would only follow if the AID
had occurred without the husband’s consent.224 A New York court
declared flatly that AID children are illegitimate, disapproving as
“supported by no legal precedent” an earlier case that had declared an AID
child legitimate.225 The court did not specify whether AID amounted to
POPULATION L. 188 (1981) (France).
216. 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 155 (1982).
217. Id. at 156.
218. Id.
219. 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 158 (1982).
220. See, e.g., Artificial Insemination and Illegitimacy, 112 JAMA 1832, 1832
(1939); Sidney B. Schatkin, Artificial Insemination and Illegitimacy, 11 HUMAN
FERTILITY 14 (1946); Stoyanovitch, supra note 214, at 267.
221. Schatkin, supra note 220, at 14.
222. Orford v. Orford (1921), 58 D.L.R. 251-52 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.); Gursky v.
Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410-11 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (citing Doornbos).
223. Schatkin, supra note 220, at 15 (quoting Orford). This reasoning was also
adopted in Russell v. Russell, [1924] A.C. 687, 721.
224. Schatkin, supra note 220, at 15.
225. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (referring to Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Sup. Ct. 1948)). In an earlier case, the plaintiff, already divorced, was estopped from
claiming for the first time that her children were the result of AID in support of her
request that her ex-husband be denied custody and visitation. People ex rel. Abajian v.
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adultery, but instead reasoned that an AID child is “begotten by a father
other than the husband of the mother” and is therefore illegitimate.226
Decisions of a similar nature were handed down in South Africa and
Germany, the South African court holding “with regret” that the child was
illegitimate despite the consent of the husband to the insemination of his
wife with donor sperm and despite the procedure’s not amounting to
adultery.227 The German court decided that a husband may challenge the
legitimacy of a child born of AID to which he consented.228 Under Jewish
law, the importance of biological parentage caused judges to consider
illegitimate “the offspring of a married woman, born to her from another
man’s sperm.”229 But since illegitimacy is a badge of shame that emanates
essentially from adultery proscriptions,230 some judges had trouble equating
AID with illegitimacy,231 although they nonetheless considered the sperm
donor to be the child’s father.232 Contrariwise, the question of legitimacy
does not arise if a single women gives birth to a child via AID.233 The
strong association between AI and legitimacy inspired the court in Zepeda
v. Zepeda to query whether artificial insemination might give rise in some
future cases to claims of wrongful life.234
Today, when illegitimacy is barely cognizable as a legal category,235
under all statutes that define the paternity ramifications of artificial
insemination by donor, the husband of an artificially inseminated woman is

Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
226. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
227. 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 159 (1982). This approach is similar to that taken
in Artificial Insemination and Illegitimacy, supra note 220.
228. 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 176 (1983).
229. Noam Zohar, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood: A Halakhic
Perspective, 2 S’VARA: J. PHIL. & JUDAISM 13, 14 (1991).
230. See id. at 15.
231. See id. at 16.
232. See id.
233. See generally SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A CULTURAL
ACCOUNT OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION IN ISRAEL 64, 71 (Arjun Appadurai et al. eds.,
2000) (discussing the support of AID, the recognition of its legitimacy, and its impact
within society).
234. 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (“If there are public sperm banks in
future years and if there are sperm injections like present day blood transfusions, with
donors and donees unknown to each other, will there not be a basis for an action for
wrongful life? . . . If such awesome experiments are successfully pursued and their
ultimate goal , the abiogenesis of human life achieved, would a being so created have a
cause of action for wrongful life against those whose knowledge and skill were so
employed?”).
235. By this statement, I do not mean to minimize the discrimination and harm that
still accrues under law and regulations of questionable constitutionality. See generally
Maldonado, supra note 29, at 360 (cataloging continuing harms against children born
out of wedlock).
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the father of the resulting child if he consented to the insemination.236
Public policy favoring legitimacy and support for children creates a strong
presumption that a husband consented to his wife’s insemination.237 The
typical method of demonstrating consent is through a signed writing,238 but
consent can also be established orally.239 Where a husband gives no written
or oral consent, even in states with no governing statute, he may
nonetheless be liable for support under contract theories or equitable
principles.240 Other cases do not reach a final determination of these issues
236. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-703 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2012); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2012); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 2012); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-4-106(1) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-774 (West 2012); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.11(1) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2012); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 39-5405(3) (2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2 (West 2012); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-129 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (West 2012);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824(6) (West
2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824(1) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(1)
(West, Westlaw through 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1412.01 (LexisNexis
2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(II) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(a)
(West 2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A1 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3111.95(A) (LEXISNEXIS 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 552 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 20158(A)(2) (2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(1) (West 2012); In re Adoption of Reams,
557 N.E.2d 159, 163 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (conclusive presumption of paternity). But
see Welborn v. Doe, 394 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (statute merely created
presumption of husband’s paternity; adoption was a more certain way of establishing
paternity).
237. See K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 65, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981); see also
Brooks v. Fair, 532 N.E.2d 208, 212-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (same policies militate
against wife’s disavowal of her husband’s paternity).
238. See In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (written consent is mandatory); K.S., 440 A.2d at 68 (noting that many other
states’ statutes require written consent); Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 296 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1996) (there was substantial compliance with writing requirement through
pleadings in divorce proceeding); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *6,
*10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991) (recognizing insufficient compliance with writing
requirement and thus no grounds for imposition of equitable estoppel); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (establishing support obligation
on implied contract theory); Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (Sup. Ct. 1963)
(same).
239. See R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923, 927-28 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (oral consent
created estoppel to deny paternity); K.S., 440 A.2d at 65 (verbal consent). But see K.B.
v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d 634, 638 (Tex. App. 1991) (oral consent insufficient).
240. See People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968); In re Marriage of
Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ill. 1990) (writing requirement might not be so strict as
to preclude finding of parent-child relationship or support obligation on other grounds);
Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604-605 (Ind. 1994) (estoppel to deny support
obligation when consented orally and in writing, where the state had no artificial
insemination statute); In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 879 (S.C. 1987) (consent
implied from conduct establishes paternity); K.B., 811 S.W.2d at 639 (full knowledge
and willing participation constituted ratification of parent-child relationship); L.M.S. v.
S.L.S., 312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (adopting moral obligation theory);
cf. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 288 (Ct. App. 1998) (estoppel
precluded denial of support obligation to child resulting from consent to gestational
surrogacy); Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (“The
contract and the equitable estoppel which prevail in this case prevent the respondent
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on procedural grounds.241
2. Surrogacy and the Cult of Gestational Motherhood
In addition to the association of alternative insemination with
illegitimacy, , many countries view surrogacy with such suspicion that it is
thought to give rise to illegitimate forms of the family. In part, this
approach to surrogacy arises from the intractable view of the legal
implications of gestational motherhood. “[I]n traditional EuropeanAmerican thinking a mother’s identity is understood as [an unwavering]
natural fact:”242 “birth itself is conclusive proof of motherhood.”243 In both
the civil law and the common law, this tradition is embodied in the maxim
“mater semper certa est, etiamsi vulgo conceperit, pater est quem nuptiae
demonstrant,” or “maternity is always certain even of illegitimate children,
paternity follows marriage,”244 which continues to carry considerable
weight, having been enshrined in the Brussels Convention on the
Establishment of Maternal Affiliation of Natural Children (1962) and the
Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born out of Wedlock (1975).245
from asserting her lack of responsibility by reason of lack of parenthood.”). But see
Shin v. Kong, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 305 (Ct. App. 2000) (where consent was not
obtained for the procedure, husband could not have parental liability imposed upon him
even via equity).
Such principles may also estop a wife from denying the paternity of her husband,
see, e.g., State ex rel. H. v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (App. Div. 1982); In re Adoption
of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435-36 (Sup. Ct. 1973); People ex rel. Abajian v.
Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (wife’s conduct estopped her from
denying ex-husband’s paternal rights); Brooks, 532 N.E.2d at 212-13, a surrogate from
raising the artificial insemination statute to negate the claim of the intending father, see,
e.g., In re Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 34 (Ct. App. 1991) (surrogate stipulated to
the paternity of the intending father); cf. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 795-96 (Mass.
1998) (stating artificial insemination statute is inapplicable to surrogacy arrangements),
or even a known donor from asserting paternity, see Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521,
522 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (donor’s signed agreement not to assert paternity constituted
effective contractual waiver).
241. See, e.g., Alexandria S. v. Pac. Fertility Med. Ctr., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23, 33
(Ct. App. 1997) (failure to appeal issue); Hill v. Hulet, 881 P.2d 460, 461-62 (Colo.
App. 1994) (collateral estoppel); Kerns v. Schmidt, 641 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994) (failure to raise issue in lower court).
242. DOLGIN, supra note 202, at 119-20.
243. Mary Ann B. Oakley, Test Tube Babies: Proposals for Legal Regulation of
New Methods of Human Conception and Prenatal Development, 8 FAM. L.Q. 385, 391
(1974).
244. JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS FROM THE
PANDECTS 64 (1863); M.T. Meulders-Klein, Cohabitation and Children in Europe, 29
AM. J. COMP. L. 359, 376 (1981) (citing the Germanic and Scandinavian countries
which have traditionally “given preponderance to the unmarried mother’s name, mainly
because maternity was always established in application of the Mater simper certa est
rule . . .”).
245. European Court of Human Rights: Judgment in the Marckx Case (Status of
Children Born out-of-wedlock; Inheritance Rights), 19 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 109,
114 (1980) [hereinafter Judgment in the Marckx Case] (basing both the Brussels
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A Belgian newspaper explains: “The principle is simple: a child’s legal
mother is she who gives birth to it. Belgian law is extremely clear on this
subject.”246 Not only is the law perfectly clear, there simply is no legal way
to “break the lines of filiation.”247 This maxim holds even in the United
Kingdom, where altruistic surrogacy is legal,248 but not in Greece, where
the law recognizes the intending mother in surrogacy arrangements as the
legal mother.249 Most countries in Europe reject surrogacy, however, so
that in this area of assisted reproduction at least, the medical technologies
of vitro fertilization and embryo transfer have not successfully eroded the
force of the maxim.250
Mater semper certa est is not the only reason for rejecting surrogacy,
because of course adoption could be employed to transfer motherhood in
such cases. Also salient are expressions of worry about exploitation and
the best interests of the child. In contrast to the United States, where such
concerns have largely been employed to call for greater protection for the
surrogate who changes her mind and to develop approaches to surrogacy
Convention of 12 September 1962 and the Convention of 15 October 1975 on the
Legal Status of Children born out of wedlock on the principle “mater simper certa est”
and in the latter convention, regulating maintenance obligations, parental authority, and
rights of succession).
246. Une vingtaine de cas connus, LA DERNIÈRE HEURE, May 24, 2005 (Belg.),
available at http://www.dhnet.be/dhjournal/archives_det.phtml?id=479992.
247. Id.
248. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 § 33 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/22/section/33. Note also the adherence to
the maxim in the South African law of surrogacy. See Lize Mills, Certainty about
Surrogacy, 21 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 429, 432 (2010) (S. Afr.). The statutory
regulation of surrogacy allows the commissioning couple to be recognized as the
parents of the child if the surrogate does not seek to terminate the agreement within
sixty days of the birth of the child. Id. at 435-36.
249. Ismini Kriari-Catranis, Human Assisted Procreation and Human Rights—The
Greek Response to the Felt Necessities of the Time, 10 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 271, 276
(2003) (Neth.) (presuming that the mother of the child is the woman who obtained
court permission under the conditions of Article 1458 CC).
250. Note that the maxim appears not to be recognized in France. Jacqueline
Rubellin-Devichi, The Reform Wagon Rolls Again, 25 J. FAM. L. 127, 134 (1986)
(noting that even if one fails to acknowledge their child, possession d’etat will be
established through proof of treating a child as one’s own). Italy, however, abolished
its rule requiring the birth mother to establish maternity by recognizing her child in
favor of embracing the maxim. Hélène Bauer-Bernet, Effect of Information Science on
the Formation and Drafting of Law, 14 JURIMETRICS J. 236 (1974). Belgium was
forced to do likewise in the case of Marckx. Judgment in the Marckx Case, supra note
245, at 121 (“[We] cannot but be struck by the fact that the domestic law of the great
majority of the member States of the Council of Europe has evolved and continuing to
evolve, in company with the relevant international instruments, towards full juridical
recognition of the maxim . . . .”). The laws of all three countries were influenced by
the French Civil Code requiring voluntary acknowledgment by a mother of her child
born out-of-wedlock. Meulders-Klein, supra note 244, at 363-64 (requiring special
formalities such as voluntary acknowledgment or judicial order to ascertain a motherchild relationship and finding that such a relationship might not be established even if
both parties are living together).
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that appropriately lessen that risk, in Europe, the concern has been that a
woman should never be a surrogate to begin with. This may ostensibly be
because of concerns about exploitation or a desire for legal certainty but
may more directly be traceable to an immovable sense of the proper role of
gestational mothers. In contrast to the United States, where courts have
been willing to “negate absolutely, or minimize seriously, the significance
of the biological bases of a surrogate’s claims to legal maternity,”251 in
Europe the force of gestational motherhood makes it impervious to such
legal maneuvering. As Janet Dolgin has observed:
The contractualization of maternity represented by surrogacy
arrangements provides an especially stark, and therefore especially
troubling, instance of the erosion of romantic images of woman and
mother first constructed at the start of the Industrial Revolution. That
women may negotiate the conditions of their biological maternity before
becoming pregnant, and that they may further choose to undertake
biological maternity without desiring or presuming that social maternity
will follow, completely disrupts traditional understandings of
motherhood.252

Whether because of fears of exploitation, a desire for legal certainty, or
an intractable ideology of gestational motherhood, European countries have
been unwilling to disrupt those traditional understandings. Their response
to citizens who go abroad for surrogacy and bring children home
documents that the new illegitimacy may not simply arise out of marriage
bias but through bias against the way a child comes into being. Surrogacy
is the culprit here, and in Europe, where surrogacy is widely banned, is
giving rise to a new illegitimacy that neither international law nor human
rights may be able to curb.
III. THE NEW ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
SURROGACY
Cross-border reproductive travel has become a more and more common
response to the restrictive laws and high prices that individuals and couples
encounter when they consider assisted reproduction.253 The law of assisted
251. DOLGIN, supra note 202, at 122.
252. Id. at 120; see also Pedro F. Silva-Ruiz, La Inseminacíon Artificial.

Reproducción Asexual. Implicaciones Jurídicas de las Nuevas Tecnologías de
Reproducción Humana, 32 REV. DER. P.R. 45, 50-52 (1992) (raising ethical concerns
about surrogacy and finding that certain religions view surrogacy as an offense to the
dignity and right of the child through conception).
253. Richard F. Storrow, Assisted Reproduction on Treacherous Terrain: The Legal
Hazards of Cross-border Reproductive Travel, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 538
(2011); Storrow, Pluralism Problem, supra note 80, at 2940-41; Richard F. Storrow,
Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 295, 298 (2005) (positing that reproductive travel arises from “the
interplay between member states’ individual (some would say idiosyncratic) policies on
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reproduction interacts with the growing phenomenon of cross-border
reproductive travel in four significant ways. First, legal restrictions on
assisted reproductive procedures or limitations on access to them by certain
classes of individuals may trigger travel abroad for assisted reproductive
services. Such laws may also inspire physicians to travel abroad to provide
services outlawed at home or to refer patients to clinics in more permissive
countries. Examples of legal restrictions that may trigger cross-border
movements or referrals are Germany’s ban on in vitro fertilization (IVF)
with egg donation;254 Italy’s, Turkey’s, and most Muslim countries’ ban on
any use of third-party gametes;255 France’s exclusion of non-heterosexual
couples from infertility treatment;256 Australia’s ban on non-medical sex
selection;257 the ban on surrogacy in many countries;258 and the
Netherlands’ and the United Kingdom’s ban on anonymous gamete
donation.259 Some of these legal regimes may also prohibit making
responsible procreation and globalist policy of free movement of persons); Richard F.
Storrow, Travel into the Future of Reproductive Technology, 79 UMKC L. REV. 295,
299 (2010) (stating a desire to acquire treatment not offered in the jurisdiction makes
opportunities in permissive or laissez faire jurisdictions more appealing, causing
individuals to seek reproductive assistance in these locations).
254. Sven Bergmann, Reproductive Agency and Projects: Germans Searching for
Egg Donation in Spain and the Czech Republic, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 600
(2011).
255. Marcia C. Inhorn, ‘Assisted’ Motherhood in Global Dubai: Reproductive
Tourists and Their Helpers, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD:
DECONSTRUCTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY AND CARE 180, 190-96
(JaneMaree Maher & Wendy Chavkin eds., 2010) (discussing seven discrete but not
unrelated factors which promote reproductive tourism); MARCIA C. INHORN, LOCAL
BABIES, GLOBAL SCIENCE: GENDER, RELIGION, AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION IN EGYPT
86 (2003); Zeynep Gürtin-Broadbent, Banning Reproductive Travel? Turkey’s Assisted
Reoroduction Legislation and Third Party Assisted Reproduction, 23 REPRO.
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 555 (2011); Marcia C. Inhorn, Diasporic Dreaming: Return
Reproductive Tourism to the Middle East, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 582, 58889 (2011); Marcia C. Inhorn, Global Infertility and the Globalization of New
Reproductive Technologies: Illustrations from Egypt, 56 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1837, 1847
(2003) (discussing how despite religious and cultural restrictions on donor
insemination, new high tech reproductive technologies are rapidly globalizing even to
developing countries); Marcia C. Inhorn & Pankaj Shrivastav, Globalization and
Reproductive Tourism in the United Arab Emirates, 22 ASIA-PAC. J. PUB. HEALTH 694,
695 (2010) (studying how local cultural ideologies and practices not found in Western
countries reshape the use of new reproductive technologies in Egypt and how these
technologies are being adapted); Giulia Zanini, Abandoned by the State, Betrayed by
the Church: Italian Experiences of Cross-Border Reproductive Care, 23 REPROD.
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 565 (2011).
256. Petra De Sutter, Considerations for Clinics and Practitioners Treating Foreign
Patients: Lessons from Experiences in Belgium, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 652
(2011).
257. Andrea Whittaker, Reproductive Opportunists in the New Global Sex Trade:
PGD and Non-medical Sex Selection, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 609 (2011).
258. Amrita Pande, Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India: Gifts for Global
Sisters?, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 618 (2011).
259. De Sutter, supra note 256; Nicky Hudson & Lorraine Culley, Reproductive
Tourists? UK Trajectories, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 573 (2011).
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referrals to clinics in countries where the procedures sought are legal260 or
even mentioning prohibited techniques to patients.261 In some countries,
going abroad and receiving treatment where it is legal is itself a criminal
offense. Turkey now explicitly prohibits travelling abroad to procure donor
gametes.262 Malaysia and the three Australian jurisdictions prohibit
international commercial surrogacy.263
Among the reproduction assisting procedures that patients travel abroad
to procure, surrogacy, heavily restricted or outlawed by many countries
around the world, poses special legal problems owing to its peculiar factual
context. Most European countries and some countries in Asia ban
surrogacy. In response to these laws, individuals affected by these laws
now travel to countries like the United States, Ukraine, and India, where
surrogacy is permitted.264 The children born of international surrogacy tend
to be born in the host country,265 and the intending parents must obtain
travel documents to return with their new children to their countries of
origin.266 For this reason, surrogacy is much easier for consular officials to
detect than cases of intra-uterine insemination using donor sperm, or IVF
with donor eggs, sperm, or embryos that result in the pregnancy of the
intending mother abroad but the birth of the child in the home country.267
260. Wannes Van Hoof & Guido Pennings, Extraterritoriality for Cross-border
Reproductive Care: Should States Act Against Citizens Travelling Abroad for Illegal
Infertility Treatment?, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 546 (2011).
261. See Bulent Urman & Kayhan Yakin, New Turkish Legislation on Assisted
Reproductive Techniques and Centres: A Step in the Right Direction?, 21 REPROD.
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 729, 730 (2011) (providing that failure to abide by the restriction
on discussing certain reproductive techniques could result in doctors losing their
license and facing criminal charges).
262. Id. at 730.
263. Jenni Millbank, J., The New Surrogacy Parentage Laws in Australia: Cautious
Regulation or “25 Brick Walls?”, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 165 (2011); Dennis Chong,
STANDARD
(Dec.
2,
2010),
Police
Probe
Surrogacy
Dad,
THE
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=30&art_id=105592&sid=3048
9519&con_type=1.
264. FAM. CODE (Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, 2002 No. 21-22, at 135)
(Ukr.); Nilanjana S. Roy, Protecting the Rights of Surrogate Mothers in India, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/asia/05ihtletter05.html (finding that since commercial surrogacy was legalized in India in 2002, it
has become key in the country’s booming medical tourism market).
265. Id.
266. Born in India, Nowhere to Belong, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 18, 2009,
http://www.timesnow.tv/Born-in-India-no-where-to-belong/articleshow/4334611.cms
[hereinafter Born in India] (relating that because German surrogacy laws did not allow
the twins to be treated as German citizens, their father brought an action before the
Gujarat high court, seeking Indian citizenship).
267. Esther Farnós Amorós, Inscripción en España de la filiación derivada del
acceso a la maternidad subrogada en California [Registration of Filiation Resulting
From Access to Surrogacy in California], 1.10 InDret 7 (2010) (Spain), available at
http://www.indret.com/pdf/711_es.pdf (describing the development and history of
alternative reproductive methods).
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After having children in this fashion and seeking to return home, many of
these new parents have been refused travel documents for their children by
their countries’ consular officials upon suspicion of their having engaged in
surrogacy.268 At home, parents have met with official refusal to recognize
the parent-child relationship or to bestow citizenship upon the children.269
Obviously, a government intent on curtailing cross-border surrogacy may
refuse to issue a passport or visa to the child, may not bestow citizenship
upon the child, and may refuse to recognize the intended parents as the
legal parents of the child.270 Problems can also arise in host countries
where the law does not automatically entitle the intending parents to
recognition as the legal parents of the child.
The case of the Yamadas, a Japanese couple who traveled to India to hire
a gestational surrogate, highlights the problems that can arise in the host
country. After the surrogate gave birth to Manji, a baby girl created with
Mr. Yamada’s sperm and the egg of a third party, the Yamadas divorced.271
Mr. Yamada and Manji then became “caught between two legal systems”
when India refused to allow Mr. Yamada, because he was a single father, to
obtain a passport for Manji or to legally establish his fatherhood by
268. In re X & Y, [2008] EWHC (Fam.) 3030, [2009] 2 W.L.R. 1274 (Eng.),
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2008/3030.html (holding that
under both English and Ukranian law, the children were made both parentless and
stateless); Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1 e civ., Dec.
17,
2008,
Bull.
civ.
II,
No.
07-20468,
(Fr.),
available
at
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/arret_no
_12031.html; KARI POINTS, THE KENAN INST. FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIV.,
COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND FERTILITY TOURISM IN INDIA: THE CASE OF BABY
MANJI
2-3,
8
(2009),
available
at
http://www.duke.edu/web/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf (discussing that
India’s dominance in reproductive tourism results from its lower costs, the large
number of women willing the engage in surrogacy, English speaking providers, an
encouraging climate, and the total absense of government regulation); Farnós Amorós,
supra note 267, at 5-6 (finding that homosexual couples seeking to conceive a child
through surrogacy often travel to the United States, specifically California); Born in
India, supra note 266 (noting the failure under German law, to recognize the legitimacy
of twins born through surrogacy and preventing them from returning to the country as
Indian citizens); G.R. Hari, Michigan Couple Lose Their Child to Surrogate Mother,
WEB-BLOG OF INDIAN SURROGACY LAW CENTRE (Feb. 04, 2010, 4:08 PM),
http://blog.indiansurrogacylaw.com/page/3/ (holding that since Michigan is one of five
U.S. states to not recognize surrogacy contracts, the biological mother is considered the
legal mother); Patrick Wautelet, Belgian Judgment on Surrogate Motherhood,
CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (Apr. 27, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/belgianjudgment-on-surrogate-motherhood/ (Belgium) (describing how the authorities in
Belgium refused to give effect to the birth certificates of twins born through surrogacy).
269. See generally Rotman, supra note 1 (noting that in France, surrogacy, “la
gestation pour autrui (GPA),” is prohibited and that the parentage of children born to
surregates is not recognized France).
270. See Born in India, supra note 268; Farnós Amorós, supra note 268, at 7;
Wautelet, supra note 268.
271. POINTS, supra note 263, at 1 (reporting that even though the couple divorced in
2008, a month before Baby Manji was born, UIkufami still wanted to raise the child
without his ex-wife).
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adopting her.272 Appeals to Japan, which does not explicitly ban surrogacy
but where the law provides that the gestational mother is the legal mother
of a child, were unavailing.273 Finally, after an Indian court ordered the
government to act expeditiously on Mr. Yamada’s request for permission to
take Manji to Japan, the Indian government issued a transit document,
Japan having issued a one-year visa to Manji on humanitarian grounds.274
Several cases illustrate what can go wrong when the law of the home
country bans surrogacy and intending parents nonetheless pursue it abroad.
Surrogacy has been banned in France since 1991.275 When couples travel
abroad to engage a surrogate and return home with a child, their birth
certificates are considered falsified and are not recognized by the French
government. Only the biological connection between the male partner and
the child is recognized.276 In the case of the Mennessons, consular officials
in Los Angeles, suspicious that the couple had employed a gestational
surrogate in contravention of French law, refused to issue a passport or a
visa for the children.277 After the children travelled on United States
passports back to France with their parents, French prosecutors attempted
to charge the French couple with fraud and also attempted to set aside their
entry in the official register of parentage, thereby depriving the children of
French citizenship.278
A judge determined that France had no
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the case, since commercial surrogacy is legal
in the United States.279 On the citizenship and parentage questions,
although the court recognized the Mennessons’ parentage, it refused to
grant the girls the French citizenship that would normally flow from this
recognition. Adoption is not a solution, since under French law, those who
have resorted to international surrogacy are not allowed to adopt because
they have attempted to circumvent legal adoption procedures.280 The
272. Id. at 6.
273. Id. at 5 (citing the Japanese Civil Code which recognized the mother only as

the woman who gave birth to the baby).
274. Id. at 6-7 (noting that the first identity certificate issued by the Indian
government to a surrogate child born in India was issued to Baby Manji).
275. J. Bo, La législation sera débattue au Parlement français en 2009 [Legislation
Will Be Debated in the French Parliament in 2009], LE MONDE, Aug. 5, 2008, at 3
(Fr.).
276. Id.
277. SYLVIE MENNESSON & DOMINIQUE MENNESSON, INTERDITS D’ENFANTS: LE
TEMOIGNAGE UNIQUE DE PARENTS AYANT RECOURS A UNE MERE PORTEUSE [DENIED
CHILDREN: THE STORY OF PARENTS WHO USED A SURROGATE] 90, 86-92, 109 (2008)
[hereinafter INTERDITS D’ENFANTS].
278. Id. at 143.
279. Gilles Cuniberti, Flying to California to Bypass the French Ban on Surrogacy,
CONFLICT OF LAWS .NET, (Nov. 5, 2007), http://conflictoflaws.net/2007/flying-tocalifornia-to-bypass-the-french-ban-on-surrogacy/.
280. Myriam Hunter-Henin, Surrogacy: Is There Room for a New Liberty Between
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public minister had alluded to being favorably disposed to the petition,281
but finally, after five court decisions in the course of ten years, the Cour de
Cassation ruled that the girls were not French citizens.282 An editorial in Le
Monde cried:
How do you justify depriving these children, now strangers in their
parents’ country, of all the rights connected with citizenship, based
solely on the way they were conceived and when there is no dispute over
their parentage? What are they guilty of, besides their birth, to merit
such sanctions?283

The Mennessons now plan to take their case to the European Court of
Human Rights284 where they may rely on cases forbidding disparate
treatment of nonmarital children. In the meantime, hundreds of children
currently live in France without French citizenship, since their gestational
surrogates were not French.285 This may mean that once they reach the age
of majority, they will not be allowed to remain in France.286
Cases in Spain and Belgium involve gay male couples. The Belgian
couple was involved in two years of legal wrangling related to the birth of
their son to a gestational carrier in Ukraine.287 The child was left stranded
in Ukraine during this period.288 Belgium finally issued a passport to the
the French Prohibitive Position and the English Ambivalence?, in LAW AND BIOETHICS
329, 336-37 (Michael Freeman ed., 2008).
281. Najat Vallaud Belkacem, Gestation pour autrui: une question de responsabilité
morale [Surrogacy: A Question of Moral Responsibility], LE MONDE, Apr. 7, 2011,
(Fr.),
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/04/07/gestation-pour-autrui-unequestion-de-responsibilite-morale_1504228_3232.html (“Even the public minister
declared himself in favor of this recognition on behalf of the interest of the child and
his or her right to a normal family life . . . .”).
282. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1 e civ., Apr. 6,
2011,
Bull.
civ.
II,
No.
10-19.053,
(Fr.),
available
at
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civil_568.
283. Belkacem, supra note 281.
284. Le Monde, Gestation pour autrui: “Nos filles resteront toujours des fantômes
au regard du droit français,” LE MONDE, Apr. 6, 2011 (Fr.),
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/04/06/gestation-pour-autrui-nos-fillesresteront-toujours-des-fantomes-au-regard-du-droit-francais_1503967_3224.html.
285. Michael Cook, Children of surrogate mothers are not French, court rules,
BIOEDGE, Apr. 9, 2011,
http://www.bioedge.org/index.php/bioethics/bioethics_article/9480.
286. See Le Monde, supra note 284 (“When they become adults, they will have none
of the rights of residency, work and the vote that French and European citizens have.”).
287. Mères porteuses: Mahous demande un debat parlementaire au plus vite
[Surrogates: Mahous Requests a Parliamentary Debate as Soon as Possible], LA
DERNIÈRE
HEURE
(Mar.
1,
2011)
(Belg.),
http://www.dhnet.be/infos/societe/article/344953/meres-porteuses-mahoux-demandeun-debat-parlementaire-au-plus-vite.html.
288. Un couple gay récupère son fils adoptif bloqué en Ukraine [A Gay Couple
Collects Their Adoptive Child Held in Ukraine], LA DERNIÈRE HEURE (Feb. 26, 2011)
(Belg.),
http://www.dhnet.be/infos/belgique/article/344546/un-couple-gay-recupereson-fils-adoptif-bloque-en-ukraine.html (discussing that because the father was unable
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young child and now recognizes a parental link between him and his
biological father.289 In a Spanish case, consular officials in Los Angeles
refused to recognize the parentage of two male Spanish nationals, married
in Spain, who travelled to California to have children with the help of a
surrogate mother.290 Twins were born, and the official birth certificates, in
conformity with a pre-birth judgment issued by a California court, listed
both men as parents with no reference to the genetic or gestational
parentage of the twins. They sought the assistance of Spanish consular
officials for the purpose of registering their parentage of the twins in the
Spanish civil registry. The consulate refused to issue visas, basing its
decision on the Spanish law prohibiting surrogacy in Spain.291 Upon
returning to Spain, the couple met with resistance when they sought official
recognition of the California birth certificates. A court hearing the matter
declared that it was a violation of Spanish law not to include the gestational
mother as a parent in the registry because the primary and most important
fact for this purpose was who gave birth.292 The Ministry of Justice
intervened to establish guidelines for the entry into the civil registry of
children born to surrogate mothers abroad. The Ministry found it necessary
to balance the interests of the children with the interests of the Spanish
government in prohibiting surrogacy. This balance could be achieved, it
concluded, by obtaining a judgment in a host country court recognizing the
legal validity of the birth certificate and making factual findings to the
effect that the contract for surrogacy was entered into without fraud,
overreaching or exploitation of the surrogate mother.293
The Spanish Ministry of Justice’s instruction embraces the legal doctrine
of comity as the best solution to the family recognition problems that can
arise from international commercial surrogacy. The doctrine of comity
speaks to whether a country should defer to the judgments and public acts
to pay for the child’s pension with the host family and was unable to smuggle the child
into Poland, the child was placed in an orphanage in the Ukraine).
289. Mères porteuses, supra note 287 (relating that the Belgian couple spent some €
90,000 before the Belgian Government had issued a passport to the child); Un couple
gay, supra note 288.
290. Farnós Amorós, supra note 267, at 4.
291. Id.
292. Marta Requejo, Surrogate Motherhood and the Spanish Homosexual Couple,
CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (Sept. 20, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/surrogatemotherhood-and-spanish-homosexual-couple-iii/ (“Spanish law expressly prohibits the
parentage in these cases except for registered for the person who has given birth.”)
(translated by author).
293. Emilio De Benito, Justicia abre la puerta a la inscripción de los hijos de
“vientre de alquiler”, [Justice Opens the Way to Register the Children of Surrogacy],
PAÍS,
(Oct.
7,
2010)
(Spain),
EL
http:www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Justicia/abre/via/inscribir/hijos/vientres/alquiler
/elpepisoc/2010007elpepisoc_7/Tes.
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of another country.294 Final judgments of courts of foreign nations, which
concern the recovery of sums of money, the status of a person, or determine
interests in property, are conclusive and entitled to recognition in the courts
of other nations.295 The judgment must have been rendered under a judicial
system providing impartial tribunals and procedures compatible with due
process of law, and the issuing court must have had jurisdiction over the
defendant and jurisdiction over the subject matter.296 A court may refuse
comity if the foreign judgment in question was obtained by fraud or if
extending comity would undermine a strong public policy.297
Denying children citizenship and legal recognition of the parentage of
the individuals who have travelled abroad to have these children with the
intent of raising them seems a particularly draconian and disproportionate
response to the problems a country fears may arise from the violation of its
surrogacy proscriptions abroad. The response does not appear to be well
geared to discouraging international surrogacy, nor does it entail any
mechanism by which a nation might express more than a mere symbolic
concern for the welfare of children and surrogate mothers.
By contrast, the doctrine of comity seems well designed to afford states
some latitude in evaluating whether the transaction abroad has proceeded in
a fashion that does not give rise to anxiety about overreaching, exploitation
and abuse.298 The recent instruction of the Spanish Ministry of Justice
acknowledges the shortcomings of using the denial of citizenship and
parentage recognition as blunt instruments in a battle against international
surrogacy. In adopting a measured, middle-of-the-road approach, one that
embraces the time-honored international norm of comity, the Ministry has
placed the burden equally on the shoulders of the state and of the
commissioning parents to ensure that, above all, the transaction not have
exploited conditions of poverty in the destination country and not have
resulted in parentage determinations that would be anathema to the welfare
of the child.
The Mennesson case and others like it have opened the door to the
possibility of legislative reform in France. Rumblings in the French
Parliament indicate a certain level of discomfort among some Socialist
294. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 101 cmt. e (1987) (defining comity “as the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protections of its laws”).
295. Id. § 481(1) (declaring that final judgments of a foreign state are entitled to
recognition in courts in the United States).
296. Id. § 481 cmt. f (enforcing decisions of foreign tribunals when the fairness and
reliability of the proceeding were previously established).
297. Id.
298. Id. § 101 cmt. e.
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Party members who believe “the prohibition on surrogacy doesn’t need to
result in children who suffer legal instability.” 299 Their proposal was to
legalize surrogacy so that the offspring would not be deprived of a legal
mother.300 Only heterosexual couples could have recourse to surrogacy, no
compensation would be allowed, and it would have to be approved in
advance by governmental officials.301 But others feel that relaxing the
strict stance against granting citizenship to children created through
international surrogacy would unjustly elevate the right to procreate above
the need to safeguard the rights of women and the welfare of children.302
The right of women to control their own bodies, it is said, does not go as
far as undertaking to become pregnant for another.303 The risks of
commercialization and harm to children, including the surrogate’s own
children, are simply too great.304 The ongoing debate is so heated that
France is probably a long way from reforming its surrogacy laws; questions
arising from it will most likely remain with the courts for the time being.305
In the meantime, the problem of how to treat the children born of surrogacy
continues to vex commentators, with some suggesting that there should be
no barrier to recognizing the paternity of the biological father while
arranging for a sharing of parental authority by his wife or partner.306 In
Belgium, too, there have been calls for legislation in response to the gay
couple who had so many problems in Ukraine.307 The current proposal is
to employ adoption procedures to finalize the transfer of parental rights
from the surrogate mother to the intending parents, with the proviso that at
least one member of the commissioning couple have a biological link to the
child.308 Others believe surrogacy should be banned altogether with strict
exceptions for “physiological impossibility.”309

299. Charlotte Rotman, Projecteur sur les bébés fantômes [Spotlight on “Ghost
LIBÉRATION
(Feb.
10,
2011)
(Fr.),
Babies”],
LA
http://www.liberation.fr/societe/01012319068-projecteur-sur-les-bebes-fantomes.
300. Bo, supra note 275, at 3.
301. Id.
302. Philippe Bas & Luc Derepas, Une atteinte intolérable à la dignité des femmes
[An Intolerable Affront to the Dignity of Women], LE MONDE, at 15 (May 23, 2009)
(Fr.).
303. Id. at 15.
304. Id.
305. Belkacem, supra note 281.
306. Bas & Derepas, supra note 302, at 15.
307. Mères porteuses, supra note 287.
308. Id. (remarking about how several bills are pending in the Supreme Assembly to
set out a gender prohibition of any surrogacy agreement).
309. Id. (“When the risk is too great for the mother or infant during pregnancy, or
where there is a physiological impossibility for the mother to become pregnant, the use
of surrogate motherhood is justified.”) (translated by author).
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There is a powerful flavor of the new illegitimacy in restrictions on
assisted reproduction with donor gametes or surrogate gestation in Europe.
When pressed on the policy behind these restrictions, states say they have
to do with efforts to prevent “unusual” family relationships from forming.
Austria recently defended its restrictions in the European Court of Human
Rights by stating it wanted to prevent two-mother families and situations in
which a child might be the object of a battle between gestational, genetic,
and/or social mothers. A French parliamentary commission, too, has issued
a report describing how children are harmed when they have a biological
link to only one of their parents.310 Unlike the old illegitimacy, these
restrictions on paths to parenthood have little to do with marriage and much
to do with a vision of motherhood that is impossible to harmonize with the
families people create through surrogacy. But rendering these families
“illegitimate” has done little to deter their formation, as the uptick in the
incidence of reproductive tourism makes all too evident. Recognizing this,
the Hague Conference on Private International Law is studying the
possibility for some form of broader response to the problems arising in the
context of international surrogacy.311 Despite the likelihood of vast
differences of opinion on the matter, it seems certain that some form of
administrative cooperation will be required to prevent adverse
discrimination against children “on the basis of birth or parental status.”312
In the meantime, there will be important work for lawyers to ensure that
children are not deprived of a legal connection to their parents and their
countries simply because they were born to couples and individuals so
committed to becoming parents and raising children that they defied unjust
laws.
IV. LEGAL PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS
Refusing to recognize the rearing parents of children born of surrogacy
and denying these children citizenship constitute serious legal interference
with international surrogacy. In contrast to laws that restrict access to
certain forms of assisted reproduction, the policy of which is to interfere
with a reproductive project before it commences either in the home country
or in a foreign country, the impact of this form of legal interference occurs

310. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA MISSION D'INFORMATION
LA FAMILLE ET LES DROITS DES ENFANTS (2006), available at
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/pdf/rap-info/i2832.pdf
311. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES SURROUNDING THE STATUS OF CHILDREN, INCLUDING
ISSUES ARISING FROM INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGMENTS (2011), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2011pd11e.pdf.
312. Id. at ¶¶ 51-53.
SUR

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/8

44

Storrow: The Phantom Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and

2012]

PHANTOM CHILDREN OF THE REPUBLIC

605

after the child is already born.313 Legal interference at this final stage of the
continuum of assisted reproductive care is arguably the most fraught for the
intending parents because they have come so close to realizing their goal of
becoming a parent. This distinction has led surrogacy attorney Steven
Snyder to remark:
Because of the parentage issues in establishing the legal parentage of the
resulting children, the legal issues become paramount and almost
primary to the medical issues. Obviously, historically the people that are
typically the parents are the woman who gives birth and her husband and
when you do a surrogacy you totally shift the legal intended parentage to
the genetic parents, neither of whom has anything to do with the
gestation; therefore, the law becomes more important than the
medicine.314

The importance of providing complete, clear, and accurate legal advice
to these families in formation will fall to lawyers. United States attorneys
specializing in advising such clients can expect to meet with foreign
intentional parents arriving in the United States for surrogacy as well as
intentional parents from the United States going abroad. Both types of
clients might best be served by coordinating with counsel in the foreign
jurisdiction, whether it be the home or destination country.
One issue that will be of great interest to clients is what standard of care
they are owed by the professionals who undertake to assist them.
Malpractice liability results from the breach of a professional standard of
care and resulting damages to a patient or client. Malpractice is
complicated in the cross-border context owing to the different standards of
care that exist in different jurisdictions. Indeed, scholars of medical
tourism have expressed concern that patients who travel abroad for medical
procedures may have little legal recourse against malpractice in
jurisdictions that defer heavily to physicians in determining the standard of
care.315 Moreover, there may be legal and practical barriers to bringing suit
against a foreign physician or clinic in a patient’s home country.316 Finally,
313. It is doubtful that the legal approach here has the policy of preventing crossborder travel. Most instances involve consular officials who simply do not know how
to proceed. In the Spanish case, we have a legal determination that the consular
officials were correct in denying the request to enter the couple as parents in the civil
registry.
314. Fertility Myths Answered, HEALTHRADIO.NET (Feb. 09, 2010), available at
http://www.healthradio.net/component/mtree/Health-Radio-Shows/Ask-Dr-2EDeSilva/Fertility-Myths-Answered-41605/details.
315. Nathan G. Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging Global Market for
Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L. REV. 71, 73 (2008)
(claiming that by opting out of the medical systems within the United States, couples
are also opting out of the country’s systems for licensing, accreditation, malpractice,
and regulatory approval of medical technologies).
316. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical
Tourism and the Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (2010).
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litigation by foreigners in the country where the service was delivered can
be notoriously difficult and expensive. Even if a judgment can be obtained,
it can be difficult to enforce from a foreign location. 317
The professional malpractice of attorneys may also play a role in crossborder reproductive care. For example, a patient may contact an attorney
for advice about the possible legal complications of engaging in
international commercial surrogacy. If the agreement between the attorney
and the client encompasses counseling on the possible legal ramifications
of pursuing international commercial surrogacy, the attorney risks liability
if she provides erroneous information that causes the client to suffer injury.
Intentional parents who proceed with brokers may encounter other perils.
Cross-border reproductive travel is an industry that is becoming crowded
with brokers, and those who engage in deceptive trade practices may lead
clients to harm but be insulated from legal redress.318 Unlike physicians
and attorneys, who are regulated, licensed and have special fiduciary
obligations to their patients and clients, a broker normally operates free of
regulation and has no obligation to eschew conflicts of interest that would
impede her from zealously promoting the interests of the patient. Indeed, a
broker’s clients may actually be the clinics that have hired her to locate
patients. In pursuing her trade, a broker may be tempted to make
misrepresentations about the services or level of care the patient can expect
from the foreign clinic.319 Under the law, if the patient is thereafter harmed
by the clinic, the broker may not be liable if she, as is typical, has signed a
contract with the patient that absolves her from liability. It is of the utmost
importance that patients understand that brokers, who provide a valuable
service and may have the very best of intentions, are not necessarily
advocates for patients but may be interested above all in steering patients to
overseas clinics with which they have exclusive agreements.320
Judges hearing international surrogacy cases have recognized that lack of
good legal advice is no deterrent to proceeding with international
surrogacy. In In re X & Y, a couple had received legal advice about their
317. Id. at 1503-04 (noting foreign courts’ reluctance to enforce U.S. court decisions
because of their objections to U.S. jurisdictional grounds and punitive damage awards).
318. Cohen, supra note 316, at 1495 (finding that foreign hospitals and providers are
very rarely satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirement as these groups rarely have the
systematic and continuous contacts with the plaintiff’s home state to establish general
jurisdiction).
319. Nathan G. Cortez, Recalibrating the Legal Risks of Cross-Border Health Care,
10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 15-16 (2010) (commenting that while
patients may sue medical tourism facilitators for failure to obtain informed consent, but
it is difficult for U.S. courts to ascertain whether the statements by the facilitators are
misrepresentations).
320. Amy Speier, Brokers, Consumers and the Internet: How North American
Consumers Navigate Their Infertility Journeys, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 592
(2011).
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plan to pursue surrogacy in Ukraine.321 The couple was unfortunately
uninformed about the difficulty they would have bringing the child back
into the country because they would not have the requisite parental order
from an English court.322 This was not an isolated case; the same difficulty
occurred a second time in the case of In re L.323 To be able to receive a
parenting order in an international surrogacy case, the commissioning
individuals must show that (1) the sum paid was not disproportionate to
reasonable expenses; (2) they were acting in good faith without moral taint
in their dealings with the surrogate; and (3) they did not attempt to defraud
the authorities.324
Justice Hedley, who presided over both X & Y and L., found that the sum
paid in X & Y was not disproportionate, recognizing that the sum paid
could vary depending on the place of the arrangement.325 The sum paid in
urban California, for example, might grossly outstrip the sum paid in rural
India but would nonetheless be in line with reasonable expenses. In
contrast, in In re L., Hedley was convinced that the sum paid was clearly in
excess of reasonable expenses.326 Nonetheless, Hedley could not disregard
the best interests of the child in a parenting order in these cases. He
remarked:
It’s probably always in a child’s interests to have a legal relationship
with the parents who are raising her. The difficulty is that it is almost
impossible to imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the
case comes to court, the welfare of any child would not be gravely
compromised by a refusal to make an order.327

Even in In re L., Hedley felt the best interests of the child must control,
“[I]t will only be in the clearest case of the abuse of public policy that the
court will be able to withhold an order . . . .”328 The most lamentable factor
321. In re X & Y, [2008] EWHC (Fam.) 3030, [2009] 2 W.L.R. 1274 (Eng.),
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2008/3030.html (explaining
that the couple entered into a surrogacy agreement which ensured that the payments to
the surrogate were lawful under both Ukrainian and English law).
322. On the substantive law and procedure for parental orders, see DEWINDER BIRK,
HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY: THE NEW LAW 141-43 (2009).
323. In re L, [2010] EWHC (Fam.) 3146 (Eng.), available at
http://www.nataliegambleassociates.com/assets/assets/RE%20L%20a%20minor%20%
282010%29.pdf (recognizing that even careful and conscientious parents are still
receiving incorrect information).
324. Millbank, supra note 263, at 199 (referring to In re X & Y).
325. Id. (determining that the payment was not excessive when referencing the
comparable cost of living in urban Ukraine and the United Kingdom).
326. In re L, [2010] EWHC (Fam.) 3146 (recognizing that even careful and
conscientious parents are still receiving incorrect information).
327. In re X & Y, [2008] EWHC (Fam.) 3030, [2009] 2 W.L.R. 1274 (Eng.),
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2008/3030.html.
328. In re L., [2010] EWHC (Fam.) (recognizing that even careful and conscientious
parents are still receiving incorrect information).
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of these cases, opined the court, was the fact the most careful and
conscientious parents had received erroneous legal advice about what
would be required to create their family through international surrogacy.
Counseling may not be the only important role for lawyers to assume in
this context. Margaret Brazier, a law professor and advocate for
harmonization of the status of children born as a result of assisted
conception, has opined that status rules for children born outside their
parents’ country of origin are necessary.329 This may be one area where
“there are good reasons for achieving a consensus at a European or global
level.”330 The Hague Conference has already begun a conversation that
will advance this important work. It is critical that any law reform efforts
that lawyers choose to undertake forcefully articulate that rendering
surrogate children “illegitimate” harms them and furthers no proper public
purpose. Bestowing a subordinate status on any child born of surrogacyis
every bit as invidious as was the stigma of “illegitimacy” that historically
attached to children born to families that did not fit the mold of one
biological mother married to one biological father.331 The work of lawyers
advocating for changes in the law will be every bit as crucial as their
careful advisement of couples and individuals considering building their
families through surrogacy.
CONCLUSION
Throughout history, the doctrine of illegitimacy has been used to heap
opprobrium and disparate treatment upon the heads of both children born to
an unmarried couple and the couple themselves. But there is far less
stigma and legal disadvantage associated with “illegitimacy” of birth today
than in previous generations. Nonetheless, new ideas about what makes
children and their families illegitimate have begun to emerge in response to
new reproductive technologies. Since assisted reproductive techniques do
not involve illicit sexual intercourse and are often employed by married
couples seeking to have children, it would seem at first blush as if they
would not be linked with adultery and illegitimacy.
Alternative
insemination was, however, associated with adultery and illegitimacy from
a very early stage, and, more recently, countries have begun to classify
families created through international surrogacy as unworthy of civil status.
329. HOUSE OF COMMONS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, 5TH
REPORT para. 382 (2007), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/7/710.htm.
330. Id.
331. Id. (finding that nationality has significant implications for basic human rights,
and therefore, judicial systems must recognize that role performance patterns have
changed and differentiating children because of their maternity or paternity should not
account for the granting of nationality).
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Perhaps it is not surprising that old notions about who belongs and who
does not have reemerged in response to new ways of procreating. These
unfamiliar technologies seem to threaten settled methods of forming our
most important and lasting bonds, the strength of which for millennia have
been thought to depend on genetic and gestational connections. To the
extent societies are unwilling to accept that similarly powerful bonds can
arise from intention to parent and functioning as a parent, and to the extent
it appears to governments that the very fabric of society can be undermined
by recognizing such bonds, they are acting on similarly powerful notions.
A response in proportion to the severe level of opprobrium that children
born out of wedlock faced in prior generations is to be expected. This
“new illegitimacy,” then, is simply the old illegitimacy in new clothing.
Governments, though, must justify their actions with good reasons.
Hundreds travel each year from countries where surrogacy is illegal to
countries where it is not. Upon their return, these families face
prosecution, refusal of recognition and denial of citizenship. To date,
governments have justified their actions by expressing worry about the
plight of gestational surrogates and the harm that will accrue to children
born of surrogacy. The biblical surrogacy-by-enslavement story of
Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar bears little resemblance to contemporary
surrogacy arrangements, however. Although some believe the exploitation
of women happens in every case of surrogacy, the abstract reasoning this
notion relies on unravels when individual cases of surrogacy are examined.
Without good evidence that the feared harms are present in the majority of
cases, it seems more than reckless for governments to proceed by
presumption to refuse to allow the children born to their citizens through
surrogacy to participate as full citizens. Fortunately, courts in some
countries have already begun to recognize that child welfare is very hard to
promote when they are relegated to a lesser status than they would enjoy
had they been born through “legitimate” channels.
Perhaps most important of all is the reality that, given the importance of
reproduction and families to human life, international commercial
surrogacy will continue, no matter what bulwarks governments try to erect
against the rising tide. This dynamic will create a most important
obligation for lawyers to protect their clients against misinformation, the
overreaching of brokers, and the malpractice of physicians. Those who
desire that international surrogacy be used only for the good can expect to
contribute no less.
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